Article 84/2021

Labour Edge

What are the requirements to be met for s158(1)(c) of the LRA to be applicable (dealing with the jurisdiction of the labour court) to make an arbitration award or settlement agreement an order of court?


The labour appeal court, in Greeff v Consol Glass (Pty) Ltd (2013) 34 ILJ 2835 (LAC), at paragraph [19], held as follows:

‘It is thus clear from a reading of s158(1A) that s158(1)(c) must be read with and subject to s158(1A). Even though s158(1)(c) refers to “any settlement agreement” this cannot be taken to mean, literally, “any” settlement agreement.  Section 158(1A) describes what settlement agreements are being referred to in s158(1)( c). So properly interpreted, in terms of s158(1)(c), read with s158(1A), the Labour Court may make any arbitration award an order of court and may only make settlement agreements, which comply with the criteria stated in s158(1A), orders of court. A settlement agreement that may be made an order of court by the Labour Court in terms of s158(1)(c), must (i) be in writing, (ii) be in settlement of a dispute (i.e. it must have as its genesis a dispute); (iii) the dispute must be one that the party has a right to refer to arbitration, or to the Labour Court for adjudication, in terms of the LRA; and (iv) the dispute must not be of the kind that a party is only entitled to refer to arbitration in terms of s22(4), or s74(4) or s75(7).’

What are the principles of set-off applied by the labour appeal court in North West Provincial Legislature and Another v National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union obo Members (2023) 34 SALLR 351 (LAC), with reference to Schierhout v Union Government …

The high court, in Van Wyk and Others v Minister of Employment and Labour (Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria and Others as amici curiae) (2024) 35 SALLR 134 (GJ), considered the constitutionality of the following sections of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (BCEA):

The purpose of this article is to highlight some of the principles underlying the legal position that the admission of trade union members outside such trade union’s scope is ultra vires and invalid.