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Article 50/2025

The scenario is as follows: in terms of a collective agreement between an employers’ organisation and various trade unions, provision is made for the accreditation of medical schemes by the relevant bargaining council, so that employees may enjoy the benefits of selecting and joining a scheme to which their employers contribute. The marketing of the various schemes, in the period before the employees make a selection, secures competition between the various schemes to enhance informed choices by the employees.

The supreme court of appeal, in SA Municipal Workers Union National Medical Scheme v City of Ekurhuleni and Others (2024) 35 SALLR 133 (SCA), had to deal with the above scenario and the interference by a third party, namely, the City of Ekurhuleni, in such relationship.

What are some of the more important principles to be identified governing the said scenario?
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The SCA, in City of Ekurhuleni (supra), adopted the following approach:

  1. the first issue to be decided was whether or not such collective agreement may be a contract for the benefit of a third party;
  2. with reference to Total SA (Pty) Ltd v Bekker NO 1992 (1) SA 917 (A), the SCA in casu held that such collective agreement could not constitute a stipulatio alteri – the relevant medical scheme was not a party to such collective agreement in terms of s213 of the LRA and, furthermore, such collective agreement was not extended to such non-party in terms of s32 of the LRA;
  3. however, the SCA in casu indicated that the accreditation that occurred in terms of the collective agreement by the relevant bargaining council constitutes an agreement giving rise to rights and obligations of the various medical schemes;
  4. with reference to Lanco Engineering CC v Aris Box Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1993 (4) SA 378 (D), Masstores (Pty) Ltd v Pick ‘n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd 2017 (1) SA 613 (CC) and Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development 2015 (1) SA 1 (CC), the court held that the interference by the City of Ekurhuleni constituted the delict of unlawful interference with the aforementioned contractual relations.
November 9, 2026

Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA reads as follows: ‘A dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including but not limited to religion, conscience and belief”.

In terms of s187(2)(a) of the LRA, despite the aforesaid s187(1)(f), a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on the inherent requirements of a particular job.

What approach is to be followed to determine, firstly, whether the reason for the dismissal on the basis of religion, conscience or belief is based upon an inherent requirement of a particular job?

And, secondly, what approach is to be followed to determine whether or not an employer complied with its duty to reasonably accommodate the aforesaid category of employees?

November 2, 2026

In the previous article, we set out the traditional approach to s187(2)(b) of the LRA, covering the scenario where an employee reached the normal or agreed-upon retirement age, but continued to work beyond such age. The constitutional court, in Motor Industry Staff Association and Another v Great South Auto Body CC t/a Great South Panelbeaters (Landman); Solidarity obo Strydom and Others v State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd (Solidarity) – combinedly referred to as Landman; Solidarity – had the opportunity to scrutinise such traditional approach and delivered three conflicting judgments. So, what approach should role players now employ, seeing that consensus was not reached in the constitutional court?

October 26, 2026

In terms of s187(1)(f) of the LRA, a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to, age.

In terms of s187(2)(b) of the LRA, despite s187(1)(f), dismissal, based on age, is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.

What is the approach traditionally adopted where an employer permits an employee to work beyond the normal or agreed-upon retirement age and subsequently wishes to terminate the services of the employee, based on age, and wishes to rely on the defence as set out in s187(2)(b)?