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Article 50/2025

The scenario is as follows: in terms of a collective agreement between an employers’ organisation and various trade unions, provision is made for the accreditation of medical schemes by the relevant bargaining council, so that employees may enjoy the benefits of selecting and joining a scheme to which their employers contribute. The marketing of the various schemes, in the period before the employees make a selection, secures competition between the various schemes to enhance informed choices by the employees.

The supreme court of appeal, in SA Municipal Workers Union National Medical Scheme v City of Ekurhuleni and Others (2024) 35 SALLR 133 (SCA), had to deal with the above scenario and the interference by a third party, namely, the City of Ekurhuleni, in such relationship.

What are some of the more important principles to be identified governing the said scenario?
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The SCA, in City of Ekurhuleni (supra), adopted the following approach:

  1. the first issue to be decided was whether or not such collective agreement may be a contract for the benefit of a third party;
  2. with reference to Total SA (Pty) Ltd v Bekker NO 1992 (1) SA 917 (A), the SCA in casu held that such collective agreement could not constitute a stipulatio alteri – the relevant medical scheme was not a party to such collective agreement in terms of s213 of the LRA and, furthermore, such collective agreement was not extended to such non-party in terms of s32 of the LRA;
  3. however, the SCA in casu indicated that the accreditation that occurred in terms of the collective agreement by the relevant bargaining council constitutes an agreement giving rise to rights and obligations of the various medical schemes;
  4. with reference to Lanco Engineering CC v Aris Box Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1993 (4) SA 378 (D), Masstores (Pty) Ltd v Pick ‘n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd 2017 (1) SA 613 (CC) and Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development 2015 (1) SA 1 (CC), the court held that the interference by the City of Ekurhuleni constituted the delict of unlawful interference with the aforementioned contractual relations.
August 17, 2026

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

August 10, 2026

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

August 3, 2026

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?