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Article 48/2025

The labour court has stated ad nauseam that its jurisdiction does not extend to all labour matters and that an applicant must necessarily identify the statutory provision(s) that confers jurisdiction on the labour court in the matter concerned. Van Niekerk J recently, in SA Medical Association Trade Union obo Rikhotso v Member of the Executive Council, Department of Health, Limpopo Province and Others (2023) 34 SALLR 354 (LC), had the opportunity to again deal with the lack of general jurisdiction of the labour court in labour matters – what approach was followed and what are the ‘take away’ principles in this regard?
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  • In Baloyi v Public Protector and Others [2020] ZACC 27; 2021 (2) BCLR 101 (CC); [2021] 4 BLLR 325 (CC); (2021) 42 ILJ 961 (CC); 2022 (3) SA 321 (CC) (Baloyi), the constitutional court said the following:
    • ‘[23] The legislation in terms of which an assignment would be made in the context of the present matter is the LRA. Section 157(1) of the LRA provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of the labour court in all matters that – in terms of the LRA or other law – are to be determined by the labour court. In doing so, it fulfils one of the stated purposes of the LRA, which is to establish the labour court and the labour appeal court as superior courts, with “exclusive jurisdiction to decide matters arising from the Act”. Section 157(1) reads: “Subject to the Constitution and section 173, and except where this Act provides otherwise, the labour court has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of all matters that elsewhere in terms of this Act or in terms of any other law are to be determined by the labour court.”’
  • Section 68(1), s77(2)(a), s145 and s191 of the LRA proffer examples of matters that ‘are to be determined by’ the labour court and are, therefore, by virtue of s157(1), within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labour court.
  • The labour court has, moreover, found that the high court’s jurisdiction in respect of employment-related disputes is ousted only where the dispute is one for which the LRA creates specific remedies, including, for example, unfair dismissal disputes:
    • ‘[24] Crucially, section 157(1) does not afford the labour court general jurisdiction in employment matters…’ (Baloyi)
August 17, 2026

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

August 10, 2026

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

August 3, 2026

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?