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Article 44/2022

Under what circumstances should contempt of court proceedings be utilised instead of having a writ issued?

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Section 163 of the LRA provides that judgments and orders of the labour court may be executed as if they were judgments or orders of the high court.  Before steps are taken by a judgment creditor to sue out a writ of execution in satisfaction of the judgment in his favour, it has to be ascertained whether the judgment was in a form allowing enforcement by means of a writ.  In the case of a judgment ad pecuniam solvendam (directing the judgment debtor to pay a sum of money), it is appropriate to seek its enforcement by means of a writ of execution.  On the other hand, in the case of a judgment ad factum praestandum, an order is enforceable by means of contempt proceedings (Hendor (CC) clearly established that an order of retrospective payment of remuneration is an order ad factum praestandum, enforceable by means of contempt of court proceedings).

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?