Article 41/2024

LabourEdge

The constitutional court, in National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Lufil Packaging (2020) 31 SALLR 138 (CC); (2020) 41 ILJ 1846 (CC), found that the membership of a union by an employee, who was employed in a sector which fell outside of the scope of the union’s constitution, was invalid and void ab initio.

With reference to the aforesaid legal position, how did the labour appeal court subsequently, in NUMSA v Afgri Animal Feeds (2022) 33 SALLR 270 (LAC); (2022) 43 ILJ 1998 (LAC), deal with the following issues:

  • what is the distinction between collective bargaining rights and individual rights, like the right to representation?
  • where an employee does not fall within the sector covered by the union’s constitution, is the union still permitted to act as a party to proceedings on behalf of the employee or in the interests of such employee?

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The labour appeal court, in the Afgri Animal Feeds judgment, approached the aforesaid questions as follows:

  • the Lufil Packaging judgment (CC) is only applicable to the issue of collective bargaining rights (e g organisational rights disputes)
  • the approach adopted in such judgment by the constitutional court is not applicable to individual rights, such as representation in dismissal and unfair labour practice disputes
  • in terms of s191(1)(a) of the LRA, an employee (and not a trade union) has the right to refer disputes about the fairness of dismissals or unfair labour practices to the CCMA or the relevant bargaining council
  • in terms of s191(5)(b) of the LRA, an employee (and not a trade union) may refer disputes to the labour court regarding automatically unfair dismissals, dismissals on the basis of an employer’s operational requirements, dismissals for participation in an unprotected strike and dismissals where an employee refused to join, or was refused membership, or expelled from a trade union party to a closed shop agreement
  • in terms of s200(1) of the LRA, a registered trade union/employers’ organisation may act in the following capacities in disputes where members are parties:
    • own interest (s200(1)(a))
    • on behalf of its members (s200(1)(b))
    • in the interests of its members (s200(1)(c)
  • apart from s200(1) of the LRA, in terms of s200(2) of the LRA, a registered trade union or employers’ organisation is entitled to be a party to any proceedings where any of its members is a party
  • therefore, in casu, it was held that NUMSA was entitled to represent employees employed in an industry which falls outside the scope provided for in the union’s constitution – and the union is not required to prove valid membership like in the case of collective bargaining

What is an employer to do when it suspects that a medical practitioner is issuing pre- signed sick notes, or permitting its employees to buy sick notes, or, alternatively, is engaging in some other dubious practice regarding the issue of sick notes? What is an employer to do when it suspects that a person is not entitled to practice as a medical doctor?

Are you required to interpret any of the following: pre-trial minutes, strike ballot guidelines, the LRA, a separation agreement, a benefits dispute, an arbitration award, the BCEA, a restraint of trade, a traditional disciplinary enquiry charge sheet, the constitution of a trade union, etc?

The labour appeal court recently, in Murray and Roberts Cementation (Pty) Ltd v AMCU obo Dube and Others (2024) 35 SALLR 116 (LAC), confirmed important principles relating to the formulation of traditional charge sheets, determining the
fairness of a dismissal, the interpretation of a charge sheet and the reason(s) relied upon by the employer to justify the dismissal of an employee.