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Article 41/2024

LabourEdge

The constitutional court, in National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Lufil Packaging (2020) 31 SALLR 138 (CC); (2020) 41 ILJ 1846 (CC), found that the membership of a union by an employee, who was employed in a sector which fell outside of the scope of the union’s constitution, was invalid and void ab initio.

With reference to the aforesaid legal position, how did the labour appeal court subsequently, in NUMSA v Afgri Animal Feeds (2022) 33 SALLR 270 (LAC); (2022) 43 ILJ 1998 (LAC), deal with the following issues:

  • what is the distinction between collective bargaining rights and individual rights, like the right to representation?
  • where an employee does not fall within the sector covered by the union’s constitution, is the union still permitted to act as a party to proceedings on behalf of the employee or in the interests of such employee?

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The labour appeal court, in the Afgri Animal Feeds judgment, approached the aforesaid questions as follows:

  • the Lufil Packaging judgment (CC) is only applicable to the issue of collective bargaining rights (e g organisational rights disputes)
  • the approach adopted in such judgment by the constitutional court is not applicable to individual rights, such as representation in dismissal and unfair labour practice disputes
  • in terms of s191(1)(a) of the LRA, an employee (and not a trade union) has the right to refer disputes about the fairness of dismissals or unfair labour practices to the CCMA or the relevant bargaining council
  • in terms of s191(5)(b) of the LRA, an employee (and not a trade union) may refer disputes to the labour court regarding automatically unfair dismissals, dismissals on the basis of an employer’s operational requirements, dismissals for participation in an unprotected strike and dismissals where an employee refused to join, or was refused membership, or expelled from a trade union party to a closed shop agreement
  • in terms of s200(1) of the LRA, a registered trade union/employers’ organisation may act in the following capacities in disputes where members are parties:
    • own interest (s200(1)(a))
    • on behalf of its members (s200(1)(b))
    • in the interests of its members (s200(1)(c)
  • apart from s200(1) of the LRA, in terms of s200(2) of the LRA, a registered trade union or employers’ organisation is entitled to be a party to any proceedings where any of its members is a party
  • therefore, in casu, it was held that NUMSA was entitled to represent employees employed in an industry which falls outside the scope provided for in the union’s constitution – and the union is not required to prove valid membership like in the case of collective bargaining

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?