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Article 40/2025

Is it a requirement that each page of an affidavit must be initialled?

Is it a requirement that every page of every annexure to an affidavit must be initialled?

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The LC, in Ellsworth John O’Connor v LexisNexis (Pty) Ltd (2024) 35 SALLR 124 (LC), had the following to say in respect of the above questions:

  • it pointed out that in casu, while the founding affidavit had been properly commissioned on the last page, every other page had not been initialled by either the applicant or the commissioner
  • the LC was, however, satisfied that there was no defect in the founding affidavit because, on the authority of Minister of Safety and Security and Others v Mohamed and Another (2) [2010] 4 All SA 538 (WCC), at [26], initialling every page is not a requirement for the validity of an affidavit
  • in the LC’s viewpoint, initialling every page of an affidavit certainly represents best practice, because it gives the court confidence that the words used in the affidavit are really those of the deponent – however, initialling every page of the annexures also appeared to be unnecessary, as the other party would always be free to dispute the authenticity of those documents, whether they were initialled or not
November 9, 2026

Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA reads as follows: ‘A dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including but not limited to religion, conscience and belief”.

In terms of s187(2)(a) of the LRA, despite the aforesaid s187(1)(f), a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on the inherent requirements of a particular job.

What approach is to be followed to determine, firstly, whether the reason for the dismissal on the basis of religion, conscience or belief is based upon an inherent requirement of a particular job?

And, secondly, what approach is to be followed to determine whether or not an employer complied with its duty to reasonably accommodate the aforesaid category of employees?

November 2, 2026

In the previous article, we set out the traditional approach to s187(2)(b) of the LRA, covering the scenario where an employee reached the normal or agreed-upon retirement age, but continued to work beyond such age. The constitutional court, in Motor Industry Staff Association and Another v Great South Auto Body CC t/a Great South Panelbeaters (Landman); Solidarity obo Strydom and Others v State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd (Solidarity) – combinedly referred to as Landman; Solidarity – had the opportunity to scrutinise such traditional approach and delivered three conflicting judgments. So, what approach should role players now employ, seeing that consensus was not reached in the constitutional court?

October 26, 2026

In terms of s187(1)(f) of the LRA, a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to, age.

In terms of s187(2)(b) of the LRA, despite s187(1)(f), dismissal, based on age, is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.

What is the approach traditionally adopted where an employer permits an employee to work beyond the normal or agreed-upon retirement age and subsequently wishes to terminate the services of the employee, based on age, and wishes to rely on the defence as set out in s187(2)(b)?