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Article 37/2022

What are the principles governing compensation when a dismissal is only procedurally unfair?

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In Zeda Car Leasing (Pty) Ltd t/a Avis Fleet v Van Dyk (2020) 31 SALLR 151 (LAC), the following principles were identified:

  • compensation is the appropriate remedy in terms of s193(2)(d) of the LRA
  • such compensation must be just and equitable in all circumstances (s194(1) of the LRA)

In Johnson & Johnson v CWIU (1999) 20 ILJ 89 (LAC), the following was stated in this regard:

  • actual loss or patrimonial (pecuniary) loss is irrelevant
  • the award is actually for a solatium as redress
  • various factors are to be taken into account to determine the extent of the award:
  • the extent of the deviation from a fair procedure
  • the employee’s conduct
  • the employee’s length of service
  • anxiety and hurt that the employee suffered

(See, further, Alpha Plant v Simmonds [2001] 3 BLLR 361 (LAC); Lorentzen v Sanachem (Pty) Ltd [1998] 8 BLLR 814 (LC))

The appeal court can only interfere with an irregularity misdirection in respect of the awarding of compensation if:

  • the court a quo ignored relevant factors or
  • the decision was based on inadequate facts

Road Accident Fund v Guedes 2006 (5) SA 583 (SCA)

November 9, 2026

Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA reads as follows: ‘A dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including but not limited to religion, conscience and belief”.

In terms of s187(2)(a) of the LRA, despite the aforesaid s187(1)(f), a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on the inherent requirements of a particular job.

What approach is to be followed to determine, firstly, whether the reason for the dismissal on the basis of religion, conscience or belief is based upon an inherent requirement of a particular job?

And, secondly, what approach is to be followed to determine whether or not an employer complied with its duty to reasonably accommodate the aforesaid category of employees?

November 2, 2026

In the previous article, we set out the traditional approach to s187(2)(b) of the LRA, covering the scenario where an employee reached the normal or agreed-upon retirement age, but continued to work beyond such age. The constitutional court, in Motor Industry Staff Association and Another v Great South Auto Body CC t/a Great South Panelbeaters (Landman); Solidarity obo Strydom and Others v State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd (Solidarity) – combinedly referred to as Landman; Solidarity – had the opportunity to scrutinise such traditional approach and delivered three conflicting judgments. So, what approach should role players now employ, seeing that consensus was not reached in the constitutional court?

October 26, 2026

In terms of s187(1)(f) of the LRA, a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to, age.

In terms of s187(2)(b) of the LRA, despite s187(1)(f), dismissal, based on age, is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.

What is the approach traditionally adopted where an employer permits an employee to work beyond the normal or agreed-upon retirement age and subsequently wishes to terminate the services of the employee, based on age, and wishes to rely on the defence as set out in s187(2)(b)?