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Article 36/2025

A case is moot and therefore not justiciable if it no longer presents an existing or live controversy. With reference to National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [1999] ZACC 17; 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC), how did the supreme court of appeal, in Mhlontlo Local Municipality and Others v Ngcangula and Another (2024) 35 SALLR 132 (SCA) recently deal with this issue?
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  1. In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [1999] ZACC 17; 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC); 2000 (1) BCLR 39 (CC), at paragraph [21], Ackermann J said the following regarding mootness:
    1. ‘A case is moot and therefore not justiciable if it no longer presents an existing or live controversy which should exist if the court is to avoid giving advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law.’
  2. In casu, the SCA held that the interests of justice justified looking past the issues of mootness and peremption. This was particularly so as there were two judgments subsequent to the decision of the high court in which the resolution which authorised the payment of the 2.5% notch increment to the employees had been set aside and declared null and void. To that end, the underlying edifice on which the high court arrived at its decision has been found wanting in both the labour court and the labour appeal court. It could not, therefore, be said that the appeal would have no practical effect, or had become academic. The ‘live controversy’ was very much extant, especially as the municipality was obliged, in terms of the high court’s order, to continue paying the respondents the 2.5% notch increase until that judgment was set aside. In the result, the supreme court of appeal was not persuaded that the argument based on mootness and peremption could be sustained.

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?