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Article 35/2025

The principle underlying the doctrine of peremption is that no person can be allowed to take up two positions inconsistent with one another, or, as is commonly expressed, to blow hot and cold, to approbate and reprobate when considering pursuing litigation. With reference to Qoboshiyane NO v Avusa Publishing Eastern Cape [2012] ZASCA 166; 2013 (3) SA 315 (SCA), what is the test to be applied to determine whether or not a party has perempted its right to institute legal proceedings?
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  1. The principle of peremption safeguards the integrity of the judicial process by preventing litigants from oscillating between contradictory positions, ensuring judicial consistency and fairness (Hlatshwayo v Mare and Deas 1912 AD 242, at 259).
  2. It ensures finality and stability in legal proceedings, which is essential for maintaining public trust in the justice system (Minister of Defence v South African National Defence Force Union [2012] ZASCA 110, at paragraph [23]).
  3. In Zuma v Secretary of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector Including Organs of State and Others [2021] ZACC 28; 2021 (11) BCLR 1263 (CC), at paragraph [101], the following was stated:
    1. ‘It is trite that the doctrine of peremption finds application across our legal landscape. The doctrine tells us that “[p]eremption is a waiver of one’s constitutional right to appeal in a way that leaves no shred of reasonable doubt about the losing party’s self-resignation to the unfavourable order that could otherwise be appealed against”. The principle that underlies this doctrine is that “no person can be allowed to take up two positions inconsistent with one another, or as is commonly expressed, to blow hot and cold, to approbate and reprobate.’
  4. The underlying principle of the doctrine of peremption is that a litigant cannot take two inconsistent positions. Accordingly, an unsuccessful litigant cannot appeal a judgment it has acquiesced to. In order to succeed on peremption a respondent must demonstrate with reference to the facts before court that an appellant’s unequivocal conduct after having obtained leave to appeal, is inconsistent with an intention to appeal (Government of the RSA & others v Von Abo [2011] ZASCA 65; [2011] 3 All SA 261 (SCA), paragraph [15]).
  5. In Qoboshiyane NO and Others v Avusa Publishing Eastern Cape (Pty) Ltd and Others [2012] ZASCA 166; 2013 (3) SA 315 (SCA), the test to determine whether an appeal had become perempted was set out as follows:
    1. ‘[3] Where, after judgment, a party unequivocally conveys an intention to be bound by the judgment any right of appeal is abandoned. The principle can be traced back to the judgment of this court in Dabner v 59 South African Railways and Harbours [1920 AD 583], where Innes CJ said:
    2. “The rule with regard to peremption is well settled, and has been enunciated on several occasions by this Court. If the conduct of an unsuccessful litigant is such as to point indubitably and necessarily to the conclusion that he does not intend to attack the judgment, then he is held to have acquiesced in it. But the conduct relied upon must be unequivocal and must be inconsistent with any intention to appeal. And the onus of establishing that position is upon the party alleging it. In doubtful cases acquiescence, like waiver, must be held non-proven.”’
  6. In South African Revenue Service v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and others 2017 (1) SA 549 (CC), it was held that:
    1. ‘[26] Peremption is a waiver of one's constitutional right to appeal in a way that leaves no shred of reasonable doubt about the losing party's self-resignation to the unfavourable order that could otherwise be appealed against.’
  7. In Mhlontlo Local Municipality and Others v Ngcangula and Another (2024) 35 SALLR 132 (SCA), the SCA indicated that peremption, like waiver, is not lightly presumed and the onus rests on the party alleging peremption to establish conduct that clearly and unconditionally demonstrates acquiescence to abide by a judgment or order (President of the Republic of South Africa v Public Protector [2017] ZAGPPHC 747; 2018 (2) SA 100 (GP)). In casu, the SCA found that there was no outward manifestation on the part of the municipality, whether in the form of words or some other conduct, from which the intention to waive its right to appeal could be inferred (National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa v Intervalve (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 35; 2015 (2) BCLR 182 (CC); [2015] 3 BLLR 205 (CC); (2015) 36 ILJ 363 (CC), at paragraphs [60] to [61]).
November 9, 2026

Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA reads as follows: ‘A dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including but not limited to religion, conscience and belief”.

In terms of s187(2)(a) of the LRA, despite the aforesaid s187(1)(f), a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on the inherent requirements of a particular job.

What approach is to be followed to determine, firstly, whether the reason for the dismissal on the basis of religion, conscience or belief is based upon an inherent requirement of a particular job?

And, secondly, what approach is to be followed to determine whether or not an employer complied with its duty to reasonably accommodate the aforesaid category of employees?

November 2, 2026

In the previous article, we set out the traditional approach to s187(2)(b) of the LRA, covering the scenario where an employee reached the normal or agreed-upon retirement age, but continued to work beyond such age. The constitutional court, in Motor Industry Staff Association and Another v Great South Auto Body CC t/a Great South Panelbeaters (Landman); Solidarity obo Strydom and Others v State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd (Solidarity) – combinedly referred to as Landman; Solidarity – had the opportunity to scrutinise such traditional approach and delivered three conflicting judgments. So, what approach should role players now employ, seeing that consensus was not reached in the constitutional court?

October 26, 2026

In terms of s187(1)(f) of the LRA, a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to, age.

In terms of s187(2)(b) of the LRA, despite s187(1)(f), dismissal, based on age, is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.

What is the approach traditionally adopted where an employer permits an employee to work beyond the normal or agreed-upon retirement age and subsequently wishes to terminate the services of the employee, based on age, and wishes to rely on the defence as set out in s187(2)(b)?