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Article 19/2024

LabourEdge

In what instances does the jurisdiction of the supreme court of appeal trump the jurisdiction of the labour appeal court?

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  • Section 168(3)(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa reads as follows:
    • ‘The Supreme Court of Appeal may decide appeals in any matters arising from the High Court of South Africa or a Court of a status similar to the High Court of South Africa, except in respect of labour or competition matters to such an extent as may be determined by an Act of Parliament.’
  • In terms of s173(1)(a) of the LRA, the labour appeal court has, subject to the Constitution, and despite any other law, exclusive jurisdiction to hear all appeals against final judgments and final orders of the labour court.
  • With reference to the George Randell High School judgment (Article 18/2024), it is submitted that, when it comes to ‘labour matters’, the labour appeal court, apart from the constitutional court, is the highest court and, in all other matters dealing with labour issues (i e where the LRA or any other Act of Parliament has not conferred final jurisdiction on the labour appeal court), the supreme court of appeal retains its appeal jurisdiction in respect of such matters.
  • When is a matter a labour matter? – it is submitted that it covers disputes governed by the LRA, such as unfair dismissals and unfair labour practices, as well as causes of action founded in terms of section 23 of the Constitution (i e the right to fair labour practices).
  • In conclusion:
    • where a matter is not a labour matter (i e not a matter in terms of the LRA or s23 of the Constitution), or the matter is a labour matter where the final jurisdiction of the labour appeal court has not been confirmed, the supreme court of appeal retains its appeal jurisdiction – even if the labour appeal court has adjudicated the matter (being a court of similar status in term so s168(3)(a) of the Constitution.

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?