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Article 17/2025

Are you required to interpret any of the following: pre-trial minutes, strike ballot guidelines, the LRA, a separation agreement, a benefits dispute, an arbitration award, the BCEA, a restraint of trade, a traditional disciplinary enquiry charge sheet, the constitution of a trade union, etc?

If so, your understanding of the principles and application adopted by the SCA in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality (2012) 4 SA 593 (SCA) is required.

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The SCA, in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality (supra), adopted the following approach:

  • the exercise of interpretation entails attributing meaning to words used in any document, such as legislation, other statutory provisions or a contract;
  • the starting point is to read the language of the provision with reference to its context (i e reading the document as a whole), the purpose of the provision, the background to the preparation and production of the document;
  • when considering the language, reference must be made to the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax;
  • where more than one meaning is possible, each meaning must be weighed with reference to the above factors and a sensible meaning is to be preferred to one that leads to an insensible or unbusinesslike result, or undermines the apparent purpose of the document;
  • when interpreting a document, whoever is required to do so must be alert not to substitute what he/she thinks is reasonable, sensible or businesslike for the actual words used; and
  • at all times, cognisance must be taken of the fact that the process of interpretation is objective and not subjective.

See, further, Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard 2014 (4) SA 474 (CC), Democratic Alliance v Speaker, National Assembly 2016 (3) SA 487 (CC) and NUMSA v Chamber of Mines (2017) 38 ILJ 831 (CC).

Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA reads as follows: ‘A dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including but not limited to religion, conscience and belief”.

In terms of s187(2)(a) of the LRA, despite the aforesaid s187(1)(f), a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on the inherent requirements of a particular job.

What approach is to be followed to determine, firstly, whether the reason for the dismissal on the basis of religion, conscience or belief is based upon an inherent requirement of a particular job?

And, secondly, what approach is to be followed to determine whether or not an employer complied with its duty to reasonably accommodate the aforesaid category of employees?

In the previous article, we set out the traditional approach to s187(2)(b) of the LRA, covering the scenario where an employee reached the normal or agreed-upon retirement age, but continued to work beyond such age. The constitutional court, in Motor Industry Staff Association and Another v Great South Auto Body CC t/a Great South Panelbeaters (Landman); Solidarity obo Strydom and Others v State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd (Solidarity) – combinedly referred to as Landman; Solidarity – had the opportunity to scrutinise such traditional approach and delivered three conflicting judgments. So, what approach should role players now employ, seeing that consensus was not reached in the constitutional court?

In terms of s187(1)(f) of the LRA, a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to, age.

In terms of s187(2)(b) of the LRA, despite s187(1)(f), dismissal, based on age, is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.

What is the approach traditionally adopted where an employer permits an employee to work beyond the normal or agreed-upon retirement age and subsequently wishes to terminate the services of the employee, based on age, and wishes to rely on the defence as set out in s187(2)(b)?