Skip to main content

Utilisation By An Arbitrator At The CCMA Or The Relevant Bargaining Council Of A Record Or Transcript Of An Internal Disciplinary Enquiry

Labour Edge

What are the consequences and what approach should be adopted when there exists a record or transcript of an internal disciplinary enquiry (or similar process) and, subsequently, at the CCMA or the relevant bargaining council, such record or transcript is considered under the following circumstances:

(a)     where there is no agreement between the parties on the authenticity of such documents, or, alternatively, the authenticity is disputed?;

(b)     where the parties reached an agreement as to what such documents purport to portray?;

(c)     where the parties reached an agreement that the documents should be regarded as evidence?

The article provides guidelines as to how the arbitrator should deal with such record or transcript in each of the above scenarios with reference to the approach recently adopted by the labour court in Hillside Aluminium (Pty) Ltd v Moses Mathuse and Others.[1]

 


 

According to the labour court in casu, the following principles govern the authenticity or status of the transcript of internal disciplinary proceedings in subsequent proceedings before, for example, the CCMA:

Scenario 1

  1. such scenario exists where there is no agreement between the parties on the authenticity of such documents or, alternatively, the authenticity is disputed;
  2. in such an instance, a party wanting to rely on such document bears the onus to prove such authenticity by leading evidence;
  3. if the authenticity is not proven or admitted, the following consequences exist, namely:

(a)      the said document is inadmissible as evidence; and

(b)     the said document cannot be used in cross-examination;

Scenario 2

  1. such scenario entails the parties reaching an agreement as to what such documents purport to portray, namely, being the said transcript of the said disciplinary enquiry;
  2. in such an instance, the party wanting to rely on the document does not have to prove its authenticity and could lead evidence and rely on the document on the basis that it is what it portrays;
  3. the document, however, is required to be introduced as evidence and cross-examination on such documents is permissible;
  4. the commissioner is entitled to accept the document as evidence insofar as it was properly introduced by witnesses;
  5. if the said document or part thereof has not been introduced as evidence, the commissioner may not mero motu consider such document as evidence merely because it was included in the arbitration bundle;

Scenario 3

  1. this scenario entails an agreement between the parties that the documents in the bundle should be regarded as evidence;
  2. in such circumstances, the CCMA commissioner is entitled to accept the contents of the documentary evidence as if it were evidence so adduced;
  3. even if no witnesses testified about the disciplinary enquiry it may, under such circumstances, be considered as relevant and admissible evidence.

[1]          (2016) 37 ILJ 2082 (LC); [2016] 10 BLLR 1041 (LC); (2016) 27 SALLR 29 (LC)

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?