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The Extent To Which An Employer Is Required To Present Evidence That The Trust Relationship Between It And The Dismissed Employee Has Been Broken Down, In Order To Justify A Dismissal

Labour Edge

To what extent is an employer required to lead evidence that the trust relationship has been broken down in order to justify a finding that the sanction of dismissal is appropriate? What are the true factors to be taken into account when determining whether or not dismissal is the appropriate sanction?

The article contains the original approach to such issue by the supreme court of appeal in Edcon Ltd v Pillemer NO and Others1 and the interpretation of such approach subsequently in the following judgments:

(a) Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Mabija and Others;[2]

(b) Easi Access Rental (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others;[3] and

(c) Member of the Executive Council, Department of Health, Eastern Cape v Public Health and Social Development Sectoral Bargaining Council and Others.[4]

 


 

Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Mabija and Others[5]

With reference to the issue as to whether or not evidence must be led that the trust relationship has broken down in order to justify a finding that a dismissal is appropriate, the labour appeal court adopted the following approach:

1. the fact that an employer did not lead evidence as to such breakdown does not necessarily mean that the conduct of the employee, regardless of its obvious gross seriousness or dishonesty, cannot attract the sanction of dismissal;

2. in some cases, the outstandingly bad conduct of an employee will warrant an inference that the trust relationship has been destroyed irrespective as to whether or not such evidence has been led;

3. it is, however, always better if such evidence is indeed led by people who are in a position to testify about such breakdown;[6] and

4. even if the relationship of trust has been broken, it would only be one of the factors that had to be weighed with various other factors in order to determine whether or not the dismissal was fair.[7]

Easi Access Rental (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others[8]

The labour court, with reference to the aforesaid issue, adopted the following approach:

1. an interpretation of the Edcon judgment9 that prescribes that, in every case of dismissal, direct evidence of the breakdown of the trust relationship should be led for the sanction of dismissal to be branded as fair, is incorrect;

2. it is held to be incorrect because it is based on the misconception that the court, in arriving at the decision it did, formulated a legal principle governing the approach to be adopted when dealing with the issue of the breakdown in the trust relationship in dismissal cases and, furthermore, it is incorrect because it ignores the fact that such case turned purely on its own facts;

3. also, the Edcon judgment[10] is not to be interpreted to suggest that evidence regarding the breakdown of the trust relationship had to be led at the disciplinary enquiry;

4. it is, of course, of importance for the employer to lead such evidence because it will assist the commissioner in the assessment of the fairness of the dismissal;

5. in the case where direct evidence of the breakdown of the trust relationship has not been led, the enquiry into the fairness of the dismissal by the commissioner must include a determination as to whether or not the breakdown cannot be inferred from the nature of the offence and/or the circumstances of the dismissal;[11] and

6. in the scenario where no evidence has been led as to the breakdown of the trust relationship, the following factors must, inter alia, still be considered by the Commissioner in determining whether or not the dismissal is the appropriate sanction: the nature of the offence, the seriousness of the misconduct, the nature of the job, the position of the employee, the period within which the employee was supposed to have committed the transgression; the nature of the risk which the employee’s conduct exposed the employer and other employees to.

Member of the Executive Council, Department of Health, Eastern Cape v Public Health and Social Development Sectoral Bargaining Council and Others[12]

The labour court, in the said judgment, adopted the following approach to such issue:

1. the general approach is the one expressed by the supreme court of appeal, in Edcon Ltd v Pillemer NO and Others,[13] to the effect that an employer is required to present such evidence in order to justify a dismissal;

2. since the Edcon judgment,[14] the labour appeal court has found that it is not an invariable rule, in every single instance, that evidence is to be led to establish a breakdown in the trust relationship, in order to justify the dismissal;[15]

3. the labour court in casu therefore interpreted the Edcon judgment to entail that the so-called rule must be read in the light of the facts of that specific case;

4. in circumstances where employees are guilty of, for instance, gross dishonesty or comparable misconduct, particularly in relation to the core job functions executed by them, the ratio of Edcon does not apply; and

5. it is well-established that gross dishonesty warrants dismissal without the leading of further evidence that the relationship has been broken down.[16]

1 (2009) 30 ILJ 2642 (SCA); [2010] 1 BLLR 1 (SCA)
2 (2016) 37 ILJ 1380 (LAC); [2016] 6 BLLR 568 (LAC); (2016) 27 SALLR 56 (LAC)
3 (2016) 37 ILJ 1419 (LC); [2016] 8 BLLR 783 (LC); (2016) 27 SALLR 115 (LC)
4 Supra
5 (2016) 37 ILJ 1380 (LAC); [2016] 6 BLLR 568 (LAC); (2016) 27 SALLR 56 (LAC)
6 See Edcon Ltd v Pillemer NO and Others supra at paragraph [19]
7 See Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others supra at paragraph [116]
8 (2016) 37 ILJ 1419 (LC); [2016] 8 BLLR 783 (LC); (2016) 27 SALLR 115 (LC)
9 Supra
10 Supra
11 See, inter alia, Department of Home Affairs and Another v Ndlovu and Others (2014) 35 ILJ 3340 (LAC) at paragraph [16] as well as Anglo Platinum (Pty) Ltd (Bafokeng Rasemone Mine) v De Beer and Others supra
12 Supra
13 (2009) 30 ILJ 2642 (SCA); [2010] 1 BLLR 1 (SCA)
14 Supra
15 See Anglo Platinum (Pty) Ltd (Bafokeng Rasemone Mine) v De Beer [2015] 4 BLLR 394 (LAC) at paragraph [19]; Department of Home Affairs and Another v Ndlovu and others [2014] 9 BLLR 851 (LAC) at paragraph [18]
16 See, inter alia, Absa Bank Ltd v Naidu and Others (2015) 36 ILJ 602 (LAC) at paragraphs [52] – [56]

Precautionary suspensions

In the public sector, the Senior Management Service Handbook (SMS Handbook) directly addresses precautionary suspensions and the 60-day time limit.

Clause 2.7(2)(c) of the SMS Handbook provides that ‘If a member is suspended or transferred as a precautionary measure, the employer must hold a disciplinary hearing within 60 days. The chair of the hearing must then decide on any further postponement.’

Regulation 6 of the Local Government: Disciplinary Regulations Senior Managers, 2010 (Regulations) provides for the precautionary suspension of senior municipal employees and Regulation 6(6)(a) provides: ‘If a senior is suspended, a disciplinary hearing must commence within three months after the date of suspension, failing which the suspension will automatically lapse.’

What are the principles governing a determination of the question as to whether or not a senior municipal employee’s suspension automatically lapses in terms of the aforesaid Regulation 6(6)(a)?

Obviously, the answers to the aforesaid question are very relevant in the private sector where, firstly, a collective agreement regulates a similar process or, alternatively, such contractual rights have been created between the parties, to be enforced in terms of s77(3) of the BCEA.

In the previous article, we dealt with the consequences of a plant level collective agreement with a definite beginning and end date. We indicated to you that, in line with s23(2) of the LRA, and an analysis of the relevant case law, that, once such a collective agreement reaches its expiry date, it expires and is no longer of any force or effect. In this article, we deal with the scenario where a plant level collective agreement is concluded for an indefinite period and the employer gave notice to terminate same.

What are the consequences when a party to a plant level collective agreement, concluded for an indefinite time period, gives notice to terminate such collective agreement?

In terms of s23(2), a collective agreement binds, for the whole period of the collective agreement, every person so bound in terms of s23(1)(c) (the members of a registered trade union and the employers who are members of a registered employers’ organisation who are a party to the collective agreement, if the collective agreement regulates the terms and conditions of employment, or the conduct of the employers and employees) who was a member at the time it became binding, or who becomes a member after it became binding (irrespective of whether or not that person continues to be a member of such trade union or employers’ organisation for the duration of the collective agreement).

What is the relevant case law development as to a plant level collective agreement that has an expiry date, i e does such collective agreement continue to be of force and effect after such expiry date?