Skip to main content

Guidelines Formulated By The Labour Court In Order To Ensure Compliance With The Audi Alteram Partem Rule When An Arbitrator Wishes To Rely On Portions Of A Transcript Or Record Of An Internal Disciplinary Enquiry Where The Parties Agreed That Such Record Or Transcript Correctly Purports What It Wishes To Portray

Labour Edge

In the scenario where the parties agreed that the transcript or record of an internal disciplinary enquiry correctly purports what it wishes to portray and the relevant arbitrator is contemplating utilising certain portions of such transcript, what guidelines must be complied with in order to ensure compliance with the audi alteram partem rule?

The article sets out the approach adopted to the above question by the labour court in Hillside Aluminium (Pty) Ltd v Moses Mathuse and Others.[1]

 

 

In Hillside Aluminium (Pty) Ltd v Moses Mathuse and Others,[1] the following approach was adopted:

  1. the audi alteram partem rule requires that the parties and their representatives be given an opportunity to be heard regarding every matter and every piece of evidence the arbitrator may take into account;
  2. if there is non-compliance with the audi alteram partem rule, the parties are indeed denied a fair hearing; and
  3. where an arbitrator is considering factors that were not canvassed in evidence, he or she is required to alert the parties of this fact and invite them or afford them the opportunity to lead evidence or make submissions pertaining to these factors intended to be considered.

[1]          Supra

November 9, 2026

Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA reads as follows: ‘A dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including but not limited to religion, conscience and belief”.

In terms of s187(2)(a) of the LRA, despite the aforesaid s187(1)(f), a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on the inherent requirements of a particular job.

What approach is to be followed to determine, firstly, whether the reason for the dismissal on the basis of religion, conscience or belief is based upon an inherent requirement of a particular job?

And, secondly, what approach is to be followed to determine whether or not an employer complied with its duty to reasonably accommodate the aforesaid category of employees?

November 2, 2026

In the previous article, we set out the traditional approach to s187(2)(b) of the LRA, covering the scenario where an employee reached the normal or agreed-upon retirement age, but continued to work beyond such age. The constitutional court, in Motor Industry Staff Association and Another v Great South Auto Body CC t/a Great South Panelbeaters (Landman); Solidarity obo Strydom and Others v State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd (Solidarity) – combinedly referred to as Landman; Solidarity – had the opportunity to scrutinise such traditional approach and delivered three conflicting judgments. So, what approach should role players now employ, seeing that consensus was not reached in the constitutional court?

October 26, 2026

In terms of s187(1)(f) of the LRA, a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to, age.

In terms of s187(2)(b) of the LRA, despite s187(1)(f), dismissal, based on age, is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.

What is the approach traditionally adopted where an employer permits an employee to work beyond the normal or agreed-upon retirement age and subsequently wishes to terminate the services of the employee, based on age, and wishes to rely on the defence as set out in s187(2)(b)?