Article 82/2021

Labour Edge

The parol evidence rule prevents a party from contradicting, adding to or modifying an agreement by reference to extrinsic evidence and, in that way, redefining the terms of such contract.  To what extent has this rule survived our new constitutional dispensation?


  1. Even after the advent of the new constitutional dispensation in our law, and more recently, the court, in Dreyer and Another NNO v AXZS Industries (Pty) Ltd 2006 (5) SA 548 (SCA), at paragraph [16], applied the parol evidence rule as follows:

‘The general import of the parol evidence rule … is well known. It is to the effect that, where an agreement is embodied in writing, the written document is conclusive as to its terms. No evidence, save the document itself, is admissible to prove them. Nor may the contents of the document be contradicted, altered, added to or varied by oral evidence.’

  1. In KPMG Chartered Accountants (SA) v Securefin Ltd and Another 2009 (4) SA 399 (SCA), at paragraph [39], the court held:

‘The integration (or parol evidence) rule remains part of our law. However, it is frequently ignored by practitioners and seldom enforced by trial courts. If a document was intended to provide a complete memorial of a jural act, extrinsic evidence may not contradict, add to or modify its meaning’ (see also HNR Properties CC and Another v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2004 (4) SA 471 (SCA), at paragraph [19].

  1. The parol evidence rule has been applied often in the labour court and in the labour appeal court (see, for example, Blue IQ Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southgate (2014) 35 ILJ 3326 (LAC), paragraph [18]; LAD Brokers (Pty) Ltd v Mandla (2001) 22 ILJ 1813 (LAC), paragraph [15]; FMW Admin Services CC v Stander and Others (2015) 36 ILJ 1051 (LC), paragraph [41]; Continuous Oxygen Suppliers (Pty) Ltd t/a Vital Aire v Meintjes and Another (2012) 33 ILJ 629 (LC), paragraph [31]; Ebrahim and Others v Sans Fibres (Pty) Ltd (2011) 32 ILJ 304 (LC), paragraphs [26]–[28].

What are the principles governing the vicarious liability of an employer for acts committed by an employee in breach of the EEA, in terms of s60 of the EEA?

The scenario is as follows: only employees working at a bakery and not employees working at a mill were party to the disputes when referred to conciliation.  At arbitration, the union wanted to join the employees working at the mill.

Is such joinder permissible?

What is the test for unfair discrimination formulated in Harksen v Lane and consistently applied subsequently by the various courts, including, recently, Premier FMCG (Pty) Ltd t/a Blue Ribbon Bakery v FAWU (2022) 33 SALLR 277 (LC); (2022) 43 ILJ 1584 (LC)?