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Article 82/2021

Labour Edge

The parol evidence rule prevents a party from contradicting, adding to or modifying an agreement by reference to extrinsic evidence and, in that way, redefining the terms of such contract.  To what extent has this rule survived our new constitutional dispensation?

  1. Even after the advent of the new constitutional dispensation in our law, and more recently, the court, in Dreyer and Another NNO v AXZS Industries (Pty) Ltd 2006 (5) SA 548 (SCA), at paragraph [16], applied the parol evidence rule as follows:

‘The general import of the parol evidence rule … is well known. It is to the effect that, where an agreement is embodied in writing, the written document is conclusive as to its terms. No evidence, save the document itself, is admissible to prove them. Nor may the contents of the document be contradicted, altered, added to or varied by oral evidence.’

  1. In KPMG Chartered Accountants (SA) v Securefin Ltd and Another 2009 (4) SA 399 (SCA), at paragraph [39], the court held:

‘The integration (or parol evidence) rule remains part of our law. However, it is frequently ignored by practitioners and seldom enforced by trial courts. If a document was intended to provide a complete memorial of a jural act, extrinsic evidence may not contradict, add to or modify its meaning’ (see also HNR Properties CC and Another v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2004 (4) SA 471 (SCA), at paragraph [19].

  1. The parol evidence rule has been applied often in the labour court and in the labour appeal court (see, for example, Blue IQ Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southgate (2014) 35 ILJ 3326 (LAC), paragraph [18]; LAD Brokers (Pty) Ltd v Mandla (2001) 22 ILJ 1813 (LAC), paragraph [15]; FMW Admin Services CC v Stander and Others (2015) 36 ILJ 1051 (LC), paragraph [41]; Continuous Oxygen Suppliers (Pty) Ltd t/a Vital Aire v Meintjes and Another (2012) 33 ILJ 629 (LC), paragraph [31]; Ebrahim and Others v Sans Fibres (Pty) Ltd (2011) 32 ILJ 304 (LC), paragraphs [26]–[28].

October 19, 2026

Section 41(2) of the BCEA regulates the entitlement of an employee, dismissed for reasons based on the employer’s operational requirements, to severance pay.

In terms of s41(4) of the BCEA, an employee, who unreasonably refused to accept the employer’s offer of alternative employment with that employer or any other employer, is not entitled to severance pay ito s41(2).

How does the assistance provided by the retrenching employer to a retrenched employee affect such employee’s entitlement to severance pay?

October 12, 2026

What is the short test to be applied to determine whether there is compliance with the reasonable decision-maker test?

When determining whether or not the arbitrator of the CCMA or bargaining council behaved like a reasonable decision-maker, what are the ‘questions to be asked’?

What is the test recently applied to determine whether an arbitration award should be set aside on review?

October 5, 2026

In the scenario where a group of employees, participating in a demonstration, picket, strike, etc, are participating in unlawful conduct, but a number of other employees, who are also participating in such demonstration, picket, strike, etc, are not participating in such unlawful conduct, will the employer be entitled to obtain an interdict against both groups of such employees?