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Article 8/2025

What are some of the more important considerations when determining compensation for procedural and substantive unfairness being present?

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With reference to Liebowitz v Fernandes (2002) 23 ILJ 278 (LAC), the constitutional court, in McGregor v Public Health and Social Development Sectoral Bargaining Council (2021) 32 SALLR 33 (CC), adopted the following approach in determining compensation in terms of s193(1)(c), s194(1) and s194(3) of the LRA when substantive unfairness is present in a dismissal :

  • the nature and extent of the misconduct is an important factor – e g continuing late coming is to be treated differently from, for instance, sexual harassment
  • consideration should also be paid to the attitude of the employee
  • if the misconduct is serious, notwithstanding procedural unfairness, compensation should not be awarded or, alternatively, it should be limited substantially

In the above judgment, the constitutional court adopted the following approach in determining compensation when the dismissal is procedurally unfair :

  • the most important factor to be considered is the degree of deviation from the required procedural fairness yardstick
  • if the degree of deviation is insignificant, same would lead to a small potential influence on the amount of compensation
  • on the other hand, if the degree of deviation is significant, same will have a greater potential influence on the amount of compensation

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?