Skip to main content

Article 72/2021

Labour Edge

What are the differences between terms expressly stated, implied terms and tacit terms?


  1. A contract is constituted by terms that determine the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract manifesting their common intention. These terms are often expressly stated. Sometimes terms are imported by law into the contract as implied terms that are used, said the court in Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 (3) SA 506 (A), at 531, ‘to describe an unexpressed provision of the contract which the law imports therein, generally as a matter of course, without reference to the actual intention of the parties’.
  2. In addition to implied terms, there are terms that are inferred from the common intention of the parties and surrounding circumstances and are referred to as tacit terms.
  3. In City of Cape Town (CMC Administration) v Bourbon-Leftley and Another NNO 2006 (3) SA 488 (SCA), at paragraph [19], the appeal court remarked that:

‘a tacit term is based on an inference of what both parties must or would necessarily have agreed to, but which, for some reason or other, remained unexpressed’.

  1. Brand JA, in Scholtz v Scholtz 2012 (5) SA 230 (SCA); [2012] 2 All SA 553 (SCA), noted:

‘Tacit terms … are by definition … neither recorded nor expressly agreed upon by the parties. They often pertain to matters which the parties do not even consider.’

  1. When considering the existence of a tacit term, the court usually applies the so-called ‘bystander test’ (adopted by our courts from the English case of Reigate v Union Manufacturing Co (Ramsbottom) Ltd and Elton Cap Dying Co Ltd [1918] 1 KB 592).
  2. This was explained by Wallis AJA in SA Maritime Safety Authority v McKenzie 2010 (3) SA 601 (SCA); (2010) 31 ILJ 529 (SCA), at paragraph [12]:

‘In our law as it stands at present the usual test for the existence of a tacit term is that of the interfering bystander who asks what is to happen in the particular situation and receives the answer: “Of course X will be the position. It is too obvious for us to say so”.’

  1. Nienaber JA in Wilkins NO v Voges 1994 (3) SA 130 (A), at 137A-C, wrote:

‘The practical test for determining what the parties would necessarily have agreed on the issue in dispute is the celebrated bystander test. Since one may assume that the parties to a commercial contract are intent on concluding a contract which functions efficiently, a term will readily be imported into a contract if it is necessary to ensure its business efficacy.’

Precautionary suspensions

In the public sector, the Senior Management Service Handbook (SMS Handbook) directly addresses precautionary suspensions and the 60-day time limit.

Clause 2.7(2)(c) of the SMS Handbook provides that ‘If a member is suspended or transferred as a precautionary measure, the employer must hold a disciplinary hearing within 60 days. The chair of the hearing must then decide on any further postponement.’

Regulation 6 of the Local Government: Disciplinary Regulations Senior Managers, 2010 (Regulations) provides for the precautionary suspension of senior municipal employees and Regulation 6(6)(a) provides: ‘If a senior is suspended, a disciplinary hearing must commence within three months after the date of suspension, failing which the suspension will automatically lapse.’

What are the principles governing a determination of the question as to whether or not a senior municipal employee’s suspension automatically lapses in terms of the aforesaid Regulation 6(6)(a)?

Obviously, the answers to the aforesaid question are very relevant in the private sector where, firstly, a collective agreement regulates a similar process or, alternatively, such contractual rights have been created between the parties, to be enforced in terms of s77(3) of the BCEA.

In the previous article, we dealt with the consequences of a plant level collective agreement with a definite beginning and end date. We indicated to you that, in line with s23(2) of the LRA, and an analysis of the relevant case law, that, once such a collective agreement reaches its expiry date, it expires and is no longer of any force or effect. In this article, we deal with the scenario where a plant level collective agreement is concluded for an indefinite period and the employer gave notice to terminate same.

What are the consequences when a party to a plant level collective agreement, concluded for an indefinite time period, gives notice to terminate such collective agreement?

In terms of s23(2), a collective agreement binds, for the whole period of the collective agreement, every person so bound in terms of s23(1)(c) (the members of a registered trade union and the employers who are members of a registered employers’ organisation who are a party to the collective agreement, if the collective agreement regulates the terms and conditions of employment, or the conduct of the employers and employees) who was a member at the time it became binding, or who becomes a member after it became binding (irrespective of whether or not that person continues to be a member of such trade union or employers’ organisation for the duration of the collective agreement).

What is the relevant case law development as to a plant level collective agreement that has an expiry date, i e does such collective agreement continue to be of force and effect after such expiry date?