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Article 7/2023

In terms of s60 of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (‘EEA’), an employer may be vicariously liable for acts committed by an employee in breach of the EEA. In the above regard, the employer has certain obligations and failure to observe those obligations may result in the employer being deemed to have also contravened the EEA. With reference to the above:

  • what are the requirements for an employer to be found liable in terms of the EEA where a sexual
    harassment complaint has been raised?
  • what are the two possible defences that the employer may have in the above regard?

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In summary, the following requirements have to be met for an employer to be liable in terms of the
EEA, where a sexual harassment complaint has been raised:

  • the conduct must be committed by another employee
  • the conduct must constitute unfair discrimination (on the basis of sex, gender or sexual
    orientation)
  • the incident must have taken place at the workplace
  • the employer must have been unaware of the incident
  • the employer must not be in a position to successfully raise either of the defences as set out
    hereunder

(Shoprite Checkers v JL (2022) 33 SALLR 15 (LC), Liberty Group v MM [2017] 10 BLLR 991 (LC);
Potgieter v National Commissioner of SAPS [2009] 2 BLLR 144 (LC))

The employer has the following two possible defences and is not required to comply with both,
namely:

  • defence 1 (s60(2) read with s60(3) of the EEA)
    • the employer is required to consult with all relevant parties and take all necessary steps to
      eliminate conduct and comply with the EEA
    • if the employer fails to do the above and it is proven that the employee contravened the
      EEA, the employer is vicariously liable for the conduct of the employee
  • defence 2 (s60(4) of the EEA)
    • if the employer can show that it did all that was reasonably practicable to ensure that the
      employee would not contravene the EEA
    • this is a defence and not an independent legal obligation on the employer

(see, further, Grootboom v eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality (2021) 42 ILJ 2508 (CCMA))

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?