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Article 69/2021

Labour Edge

What are the requirements to be met for s200B of the LRA to be applicable?


The labour appeal court, in Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union and Others v Buffalo Coal Dundee (Pty) Ltd and Another [2018] 9 BLLR 837 (CC), considered this section of the LRA thus:

‘[28]   The party who wants to invoke s200B must not only show that the persons are carrying on or conducting an associated or related business but also that the intent or effect of doing so is or was to directly or indirectly defeat the purpose of the Act or any employment law. In this matter, the appellants succeeded in showing that the respondents carried on associated or related business. They failed to prove that there was an intention to directly or indirectly defeat the purpose of the Act or any other employment law neither did they prove that the effect of the business arrangement was to indirectly or directly undermine the purpose of the Act or any other employment law. It therefore matters not, for the purposes of this judgment, whether s200B has a retrospective effect or not. We therefore do not have to decide that point.’

Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA reads as follows: ‘A dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including but not limited to religion, conscience and belief”.

In terms of s187(2)(a) of the LRA, despite the aforesaid s187(1)(f), a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on the inherent requirements of a particular job.

What approach is to be followed to determine, firstly, whether the reason for the dismissal on the basis of religion, conscience or belief is based upon an inherent requirement of a particular job?

And, secondly, what approach is to be followed to determine whether or not an employer complied with its duty to reasonably accommodate the aforesaid category of employees?

In the previous article, we set out the traditional approach to s187(2)(b) of the LRA, covering the scenario where an employee reached the normal or agreed-upon retirement age, but continued to work beyond such age. The constitutional court, in Motor Industry Staff Association and Another v Great South Auto Body CC t/a Great South Panelbeaters (Landman); Solidarity obo Strydom and Others v State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd (Solidarity) – combinedly referred to as Landman; Solidarity – had the opportunity to scrutinise such traditional approach and delivered three conflicting judgments. So, what approach should role players now employ, seeing that consensus was not reached in the constitutional court?

In terms of s187(1)(f) of the LRA, a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to, age.

In terms of s187(2)(b) of the LRA, despite s187(1)(f), dismissal, based on age, is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.

What is the approach traditionally adopted where an employer permits an employee to work beyond the normal or agreed-upon retirement age and subsequently wishes to terminate the services of the employee, based on age, and wishes to rely on the defence as set out in s187(2)(b)?