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Article 65/2021

Labour Edge

What is the purpose of a strike or lockout notice?

In NASECGWU and Others v Donco Investments (Pty) Ltd (2010) 31 ILJ 977 (LC), at paragraph [16], the labour court held as follows:

‘What, however, stands out from all of these cases is the fact that it is the purpose of the strike or lockout notice to give the employer or the union and employees an opportunity to reflect on the proposed action and their response thereto. The reason for allowing the parties this opportunity is obvious: Once a lockout is instituted, the employer does not have to remunerate the locked out employees. Likewise, once the employees embark on strike action because the employer does not wish to accede to their demands, the principle of no work no pay will apply. The economic consequences of any decision taken during the 48-hour notice period are therefore important to both parties. The possibility of settling the dispute either by making a counter-proposal which may eventually settle the dispute or acceding to a demand in order to avert the strike or even abandon the strike or lockout, is of equal importance. It is therefore, in my view, clear that the legislature had intended to afford parties an opportunity to reflect on the consequences of the lockout or strike notice. Section 64(1)(c) read in its proper context and read against at least two of the primary objects of the LRA, which are to promote collective bargaining and to promote the effective resolution of labour disputes, must be interpreted to mean that the 48-hour notice serves as an opportunity to parties to reflect on the consequences of the strike or lockout notice.’

November 9, 2026

Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA reads as follows: ‘A dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including but not limited to religion, conscience and belief”.

In terms of s187(2)(a) of the LRA, despite the aforesaid s187(1)(f), a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on the inherent requirements of a particular job.

What approach is to be followed to determine, firstly, whether the reason for the dismissal on the basis of religion, conscience or belief is based upon an inherent requirement of a particular job?

And, secondly, what approach is to be followed to determine whether or not an employer complied with its duty to reasonably accommodate the aforesaid category of employees?

November 2, 2026

In the previous article, we set out the traditional approach to s187(2)(b) of the LRA, covering the scenario where an employee reached the normal or agreed-upon retirement age, but continued to work beyond such age. The constitutional court, in Motor Industry Staff Association and Another v Great South Auto Body CC t/a Great South Panelbeaters (Landman); Solidarity obo Strydom and Others v State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd (Solidarity) – combinedly referred to as Landman; Solidarity – had the opportunity to scrutinise such traditional approach and delivered three conflicting judgments. So, what approach should role players now employ, seeing that consensus was not reached in the constitutional court?

October 26, 2026

In terms of s187(1)(f) of the LRA, a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to, age.

In terms of s187(2)(b) of the LRA, despite s187(1)(f), dismissal, based on age, is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.

What is the approach traditionally adopted where an employer permits an employee to work beyond the normal or agreed-upon retirement age and subsequently wishes to terminate the services of the employee, based on age, and wishes to rely on the defence as set out in s187(2)(b)?