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Article 64/2022

What is the content of the common purpose doctrine in the misconduct environment?

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The following principles can be extracted from Chauke v Leeson Motors (1998) 19 ILJ 144 (LAC); FAWU v Amalgamated Beverage Industries (1994) 15 ILJ 1057 (LAC); SAMWU v City of Cape Town (2011) 22 SALLR 145 (LC):

  • the doctrine of common purpose is applicable where the misconduct is proved but the actual perpetrators are not identified
  • when applying the doctrine of common purpose, the employer knows that there are innocent employees, but there is no evidence as to the actual perpetrator(s)
  • there are two kinds of justification for the dismissal of such innocent employees, namely:
  • an operational justification, where it is necessary to save the ‘life of the enterprise’ or
  • where there is no operational justification but sufficient grounds exist for inferring that the entire group is responsible or involved in the misconduct – a collective motive is therefore inferred from the action of the entire group and the onus is on the employees in the group to absolve themselves
November 9, 2026

Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA reads as follows: ‘A dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including but not limited to religion, conscience and belief”.

In terms of s187(2)(a) of the LRA, despite the aforesaid s187(1)(f), a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on the inherent requirements of a particular job.

What approach is to be followed to determine, firstly, whether the reason for the dismissal on the basis of religion, conscience or belief is based upon an inherent requirement of a particular job?

And, secondly, what approach is to be followed to determine whether or not an employer complied with its duty to reasonably accommodate the aforesaid category of employees?

November 2, 2026

In the previous article, we set out the traditional approach to s187(2)(b) of the LRA, covering the scenario where an employee reached the normal or agreed-upon retirement age, but continued to work beyond such age. The constitutional court, in Motor Industry Staff Association and Another v Great South Auto Body CC t/a Great South Panelbeaters (Landman); Solidarity obo Strydom and Others v State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd (Solidarity) – combinedly referred to as Landman; Solidarity – had the opportunity to scrutinise such traditional approach and delivered three conflicting judgments. So, what approach should role players now employ, seeing that consensus was not reached in the constitutional court?

October 26, 2026

In terms of s187(1)(f) of the LRA, a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to, age.

In terms of s187(2)(b) of the LRA, despite s187(1)(f), dismissal, based on age, is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.

What is the approach traditionally adopted where an employer permits an employee to work beyond the normal or agreed-upon retirement age and subsequently wishes to terminate the services of the employee, based on age, and wishes to rely on the defence as set out in s187(2)(b)?