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Article 63/2021

Labour Edge

Is it a requirement that a strike must actually start before a lockout can be lawfully implemented?


In Technikon SA v National Union of Technikon Employees of SA (2001) 22 ILJ 427 (LAC), at paragraph [29], the following was stated:

‘S64 also does not say that once employees have given notice to strike or once they have begun with their strike before the employer can either give its notice to lockout or can institute its lockout, the employer can no longer exercise its recourse to lockout under s64(1) even if all the requirements have been met. Equally, there is no provision to the effect that, if the employer has given the notice to lockout first or has begun with its lockout before the employees can begin with their strike or can give their notice to strike, the employees lose their right to strike. This, therefore, means that a lockout may commence before, simultaneously with, or, after, a strike has commenced. It also means that a lockout and a strike can run concurrently between the same parties. What this would mean in practice is that the strikers would be excluded from the premises of the employer.’

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?