Is it a requirement that a strike must actually start before a lockout can be lawfully implemented?
In Technikon SA v National Union of Technikon Employees of SA (2001) 22 ILJ 427 (LAC), at paragraph , the following was stated:
‘S64 also does not say that once employees have given notice to strike or once they have begun with their strike before the employer can either give its notice to lockout or can institute its lockout, the employer can no longer exercise its recourse to lockout under s64(1) even if all the requirements have been met. Equally, there is no provision to the effect that, if the employer has given the notice to lockout first or has begun with its lockout before the employees can begin with their strike or can give their notice to strike, the employees lose their right to strike. This, therefore, means that a lockout may commence before, simultaneously with, or, after, a strike has commenced. It also means that a lockout and a strike can run concurrently between the same parties. What this would mean in practice is that the strikers would be excluded from the premises of the employer.’
In Minister of Police v M and Others (2016) 27 SALLR 53 (LC); (2017) 38 ILJ 402 (LC), the labour court identified the content of hearsay evidence of a special type affording greater weight than simple hearsay. What is the approach adopted by the labour court in such case as to the transcript of an internal enquiry admitted as hearsay evidence in terms of s3(1)(c) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act? Subsequent to such judgment, the labour court, in Department of Home Affairs v General Public Service Sector Bargaining Council and Others (2019) 30 SALLR 172 (LC); (2019) 40 ILJ 2544 (LC), had the opportunity to apply the approach adopted in the aforesaid judgment to the specific facts of this matter. In this subsequent judgment, how did the labour court identify such transcript of an internal enquiry as not constituting hearsay of a special type (as required in Minister of Police v M (supra))?
According to the constitutional court, when a referral is made to the CCMA or a bargaining council concerning a dismissal, is it a requirement that the reason for the dismissal (i.e. misconduct, incapacity poor work performance, etc) is also identified in order for such CCMA or bargaining council to require the requisite jurisdiction?
What are the principles governing hearsay evidence as contained in the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1998 and applied by the labour court in, inter alia, Swiss South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Louw NO  4 BLLR 373 (LC) and NUMSA v SA Metal & Engineering Industries Bargaining Council and Others (2014) 25 SALLR 4 (LC)?