Skip to main content

Article 5/2022

Does sexual harassment fall within the protection provided to an employer in terms of the Compensation for Occupational and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 (‘COIDA’)?

_____________________________________

Once the employee in the high court, in Erasmus v Dr Beyers Naude Local Municipality and Jack (2021) 32 SALLR 6 (ECG), proved that she had been sexually harassed and that her employer was vicariously liable for such delict, the municipality made application for leave to appeal, holding that the relief claimed had not been competent in the first place, seeing that Erasmus was obliged to pursue her remedies in terms of COIDA.

In terms of s35 of COIDA, an employee or dependent of an employee is not entitled to recover damages in respect of any occupational injury or disease resulting in the disablement or death of such employee, against such employee’s employer.  The high court further held as follows:

  • in refusing the application for leave to appeal on the basis that sexual harassment does not fall within the definition of accident arising out of and in the course of employment, it was further held that a strong message was to be sent to employers that they would be liable for the failure to protect the employees within the context of sexual violence
  • the court followed the approach as already dealt with in previous articles, with reference to Churchill v Premier of Mpumalanga and Another (2021) 32 SALLR 27 (SCA) [Article 2/2022]
November 9, 2026

Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA reads as follows: ‘A dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including but not limited to religion, conscience and belief”.

In terms of s187(2)(a) of the LRA, despite the aforesaid s187(1)(f), a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on the inherent requirements of a particular job.

What approach is to be followed to determine, firstly, whether the reason for the dismissal on the basis of religion, conscience or belief is based upon an inherent requirement of a particular job?

And, secondly, what approach is to be followed to determine whether or not an employer complied with its duty to reasonably accommodate the aforesaid category of employees?

November 2, 2026

In the previous article, we set out the traditional approach to s187(2)(b) of the LRA, covering the scenario where an employee reached the normal or agreed-upon retirement age, but continued to work beyond such age. The constitutional court, in Motor Industry Staff Association and Another v Great South Auto Body CC t/a Great South Panelbeaters (Landman); Solidarity obo Strydom and Others v State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd (Solidarity) – combinedly referred to as Landman; Solidarity – had the opportunity to scrutinise such traditional approach and delivered three conflicting judgments. So, what approach should role players now employ, seeing that consensus was not reached in the constitutional court?

October 26, 2026

In terms of s187(1)(f) of the LRA, a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to, age.

In terms of s187(2)(b) of the LRA, despite s187(1)(f), dismissal, based on age, is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.

What is the approach traditionally adopted where an employer permits an employee to work beyond the normal or agreed-upon retirement age and subsequently wishes to terminate the services of the employee, based on age, and wishes to rely on the defence as set out in s187(2)(b)?