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Article 59/2022

To what extent may an employer pay non-striking employees a bonus during a strike?

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The original position is reflected in SACCAWU v OK Bazaars (1929) Ltd (1995) 16 ILJ 1031 (A) where Grosskopf JA held the following:

  • measures to discourage strikes are encouraged and legally permissible (e.g. the offering of financial inducement to non-strikers)
  • the threat of withholding a bonus from strikers or the actual withholding of such a bonus does not affect workers’ freedom to strike
  • it is unreasonable to deprive non-striking workers of a bonus merely because others are engaged in a strike with which the non-strikers have no sympathy

(The above approach is followed in National Union of Mineworkers v Cullinan Diamond Mine, a division of Petra Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd (2019) 30 SALLR 184 (LC); (2019) 40 ILJ 1826 (LC) (‘Petra Diamonds (LC)’) and National Union of Mineworkers v Petra Diamonds t/a Cullinan Diamond Mine (2021) 32 SALLR 9 (LAC); (2021) 42 ILJ 785 (LAC) (‘Petra Diamonds (LAC)’)

The industrial court, in Chemical Workers Industrial Union v BP South Africa (1991) 12 ILJ 599 (LC), held the viewpoint that there were good and compelling economic reasons to differentiate between striking and non-striking workers for the duration of a strike (see also East Rand Gold and Uranium Co Ltd v NUM (1989) 10 ILJ 683 (LAC)) – this approach was followed in Petra Diamonds (LC) and Petra Diamonds (LAC)

The following labour court judgments, however, adopted a different approach, as that set out above:

  • in National Union of Mineworkers v Namakwa Sands – a division of Anglo Operations Ltd (2008) 29 ILJ 698 (LC), it was held that the payment of a so-called redeployment allowance and free meals per se amounted to a breach of s5(3) of the LRA
  • in Food & Allied Workers Union and Others v Pets Products (Pty) Ltd (2000) 21 ILJ 1100 (LC), it was held that a R200 voucher paid to non-striking employees for hard work performed during a strike and going the extra mile, so to speak, per se amounted to a breach of s5(1) of the LRA

(The above approach was not followed in Petra Diamonds (LC) and Petra Diamonds (LAC).)

In Petra Diamonds (LAC), the following approach was adopted:

  • the question to be answered is whether a differentiation between non-striking employees and striking employees is justified in the circumstances
  • economic sanctions underwrite the collective bargaining process
  • the countervailing power of an employer to a strike is not the prerogative to lockout but indeed the prerogative to act unilaterally
  • consequently, what must be determined is whether or not the unilateral offer to pay a bonus, extra pay, etc, is:
  • suitable and
  • necessary (proportional)
  • to protect property and business
  • the above is, in essence, a factual question
  • in casu, it was found that such unilateral offer was justified, seeing that it was proportional and protected the business of the employer

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?