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Article 56/2021

Labour Edge

When a secondary employer seeks an interdict prohibiting a secondary strike, what is the nature of the onus on the secondary employer?


In Samancor Ltd and Another v National Union of Metalworkers of SA (1999) 20 ILJ 2941 (LC), [1999] 11 BLLR 1202 (LC), the court held that:

‘[5]     If an interdict is sought, the onus rests on the secondary employer, even on the return day, to prove that the interdict should be granted. The employer must show that the conditions for embarking on a secondary strike have not been met. The employer would therefore also have to show that, as in this case, the secondary strike is unreasonable or not proportional.

[6]      The union would have to rebut any prima facie case that the employer may make out and may have to justify its decision to have embarked on the secondary strike.

What are the principles governing common purpose misconduct?

What are the principles governing an employee’s duty to disclose to his/her employer information about misconduct?

In Article 31, we dealt with the distinction between desertion and abscondment.

In Article 32, we dealt with the misconduct of deeming desertion.

In this article, we will deal with termination of employment by operation of law in the private sector – similar to deeming to be discharged in the public sector.