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Article 56/2021

Labour Edge

When a secondary employer seeks an interdict prohibiting a secondary strike, what is the nature of the onus on the secondary employer?

In Samancor Ltd and Another v National Union of Metalworkers of SA (1999) 20 ILJ 2941 (LC), [1999] 11 BLLR 1202 (LC), the court held that:

‘[5]     If an interdict is sought, the onus rests on the secondary employer, even on the return day, to prove that the interdict should be granted. The employer must show that the conditions for embarking on a secondary strike have not been met. The employer would therefore also have to show that, as in this case, the secondary strike is unreasonable or not proportional.

[6]      The union would have to rebut any prima facie case that the employer may make out and may have to justify its decision to have embarked on the secondary strike.

September 7, 2026

The previous article dealt with the distinction between misconduct constituting desertion and misconduct constituting abscondment – see, further, in this regard, Okhahlamba Local Municipality v Mabuya (2021) 32 SALLR 12 (LC).

In this article, what we attempt to do is provide some clarity as to a very different misconduct, namely, the misconduct of deeming desertion.

August 31, 2026

What is the difference between desertion and abscondment?

August 17, 2026

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?