Article 56/2021

Labour Edge

When a secondary employer seeks an interdict prohibiting a secondary strike, what is the nature of the onus on the secondary employer?

In Samancor Ltd and Another v National Union of Metalworkers of SA (1999) 20 ILJ 2941 (LC), [1999] 11 BLLR 1202 (LC), the court held that:

‘[5]     If an interdict is sought, the onus rests on the secondary employer, even on the return day, to prove that the interdict should be granted. The employer must show that the conditions for embarking on a secondary strike have not been met. The employer would therefore also have to show that, as in this case, the secondary strike is unreasonable or not proportional.

[6]      The union would have to rebut any prima facie case that the employer may make out and may have to justify its decision to have embarked on the secondary strike.

On what basis will a client of a labour broker be held vicariously liable for the injuries suffered by an employee employed by a labour broker when such employee performs functions at the client’s workplace?

Is an employer vicariously liable where its employee is sexually harassed by a superior employee?

It is well-established that an employer is vicariously liable (faultlessly liable) for the wrong committed by an employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment (Feldman v Mall 1945 AD 733).