Article 56/2021

Labour Edge

When a secondary employer seeks an interdict prohibiting a secondary strike, what is the nature of the onus on the secondary employer?


In Samancor Ltd and Another v National Union of Metalworkers of SA (1999) 20 ILJ 2941 (LC), [1999] 11 BLLR 1202 (LC), the court held that:

‘[5]     If an interdict is sought, the onus rests on the secondary employer, even on the return day, to prove that the interdict should be granted. The employer must show that the conditions for embarking on a secondary strike have not been met. The employer would therefore also have to show that, as in this case, the secondary strike is unreasonable or not proportional.

[6]      The union would have to rebut any prima facie case that the employer may make out and may have to justify its decision to have embarked on the secondary strike.

What alternative claim(s) exist in delict to a statutory automatically unfair dismissal, a statutory constructive dismissal and a statutory unfair discrimination claim?

The scenario is as follows: in terms of a collective agreement between an employers’ organisation and various trade unions, provision is made for the accreditation of medical schemes by the relevant bargaining council, so that employees may enjoy the benefits of selecting and joining a scheme to which their employers contribute.

The labour court is afforded jurisdiction ito s77(1), read with ss77(3), of the BCEA to hear and determine any matter concerning a contract of employment, irrespective of whether a basic condition of employment constitutes a term of contract.