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Article 52/2024

LabourEdge

What are the principles governing the vicarious liability of an employer for acts committed by an employee in breach of the EEA, in terms of s60 of the EEA?

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The principles extracted from Shoprite Checkers v JL (2022) 33 SALLR 15 (LC); (2022) 43 ILJ 903 (LC), Liberty Group v MM [2017] 10 BLLR 991 (LC), Potgieter v National Commissioner of SAPS [2009] 2 BLLR 144 (LC), Amathole District Municipality v CCMA (2022) 33 SALLR 49 (LAC); (2023) 44 ILJ 109 (LAC) and Solidarity obo Oosthuizen v SAPS (2023) 34 SALLR 80 (LC); (2023) 44 ILJ 882 (LC) are as follows:

  • such vicarious liability only exists when the following jurisdictional preconditions are met:
    • the conduct must have been committed by another employee
    • the conduct must constitute unfair discrimination (sex/gender, sexual orientation, etc)
    • the incident must have taken place at the workplace
    • the employer must have been unaware of the incident
  • there are two possible defences for an employer and the employer is not required to comply with both (Biggar v City of Johannesburg [2007] 8 BLLR 783 (LC)):

Defence 1 – s60(2) read with s60(3) of the EEA

  • the employer is required to consult with all relevant parties and take all necessary steps to eliminate the conduct and ensure compliance with the EEA
  • f the employer fails to do the above and it is proven that the employee contravened the EEA, the employer will be held vicariously liable for the conduct of the employee

Defence 2 – s60(4) of the EEA

  • if the employer can show that it did all that was reasonably practicable to ensure that the employee would not contravene the EEA, the employer will not be held vicariously liable
  • failure to comply with s60(4) does not render the employer liable for any acts of sexual harassment – it is a defence and not an independent legal obligation

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?