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Article 49/2022

In terms of s191(12) of the LRA, an employee being retrenched under certain limited circumstances has the choice of referring the matter either to arbitration or the labour court.  Is s191(12) of the LRA applicable if the individual employee’s dismissal formed part of a bigger retrenchment exercise involving other employees?

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Section 191(12) does not preclude an employee (who is consulted individually or dismissed individually) from having a dispute arbitrated by the CCMA simply because his retrenchment has formed part of a bigger retrenchment exercise involving other employees.

Commissioner Paul Botha, on 23 April 2014, in fact, issued a ruling to that effect in the unreported case of Van Rooyen Vermaak v PGC Group of Companies (Pty) Ltd.  He found that s191(12) applied and that the commission did have jurisdiction to arbitrate in a dispute where Mr Van Rooyen Vermaak had been one of a number of employees dismissed due to the respondent’s operational requirements, but where he had been consulted individually.

The employer, PGC Group of Companies (Pty) Ltd, took the ruling on review, but the labour court, in PGC Group of Companies (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (unreported case number JR1150/14, delivered on 14 August 2018), upheld his jurisdictional ruling, inter alia, stating the following:

‘[18] The first submission, that s191(12)(a) cannot apply when more than one employee is dismissed for operational reasons, cannot be correct.  Section 191(12)(a) must cater for a different scenario than paragraph (b).  Subsection 191(12)(a) finds application where more than one employee is dismissed for operational requirements and the employer has followed a consultation procedure that applied to that employee only.

[19] The second question is a question of fact as to whether the employer followed a consultation procedure that applied to that employee only.  The applicant (PGC Group) refers to documentation and indications that the third respondent (Van Rooyen Vermaak) was part of the general process.  In a sense he was.  That however is not the test.  The test is whether the employer followed a consultation process that applied to him.

[20] It is common cause that there was more than one employee affected.  The test however is whether the applicant (PGC Group) followed a process with the respondent (Van Rooyen Vermaak) separate from the rest.’

The court (at paragraphs [26] and [28]) concluded that there had been a process in general that had encompassed several employees, as opposed to the procedure that the employer had adopted in respect of Van Rooyen Vermaak.  The latter had been consulted on his own and the employer had concerned itself separately with his position whilst the wider process was continuing.  The court consequently held that Commissioner Botha’s finding had been correct and that the CCMA did have jurisdiction to arbitrate the dispute.

The employer’s subsequent application for leave to appeal was dismissed on 11 October 2018 and it had then petitioned the labour appeal court – also to no avail.  The case ultimately ended up in the constitutional court under case number CCT 74/19.  The constitutional court dismissed the employer’s application for leave to appeal on 22 May 2019, holding that it bore no reasonable prospects of success.

In Bouwer v South Zambezi Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd (2021) 42 ILJ 423 (CC), the CCMA, on the basis of what is stated above, concluded that in casu the applicant was the only person consulted and the only person dismissed and, therefore, the applicant qualified to exercise an election to refer the matter to the CCMA in terms of s191(12)(b) and s191(12)(c) of the LRA.

Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA reads as follows: ‘A dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including but not limited to religion, conscience and belief”.

In terms of s187(2)(a) of the LRA, despite the aforesaid s187(1)(f), a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on the inherent requirements of a particular job.

What approach is to be followed to determine, firstly, whether the reason for the dismissal on the basis of religion, conscience or belief is based upon an inherent requirement of a particular job?

And, secondly, what approach is to be followed to determine whether or not an employer complied with its duty to reasonably accommodate the aforesaid category of employees?

In the previous article, we set out the traditional approach to s187(2)(b) of the LRA, covering the scenario where an employee reached the normal or agreed-upon retirement age, but continued to work beyond such age. The constitutional court, in Motor Industry Staff Association and Another v Great South Auto Body CC t/a Great South Panelbeaters (Landman); Solidarity obo Strydom and Others v State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd (Solidarity) – combinedly referred to as Landman; Solidarity – had the opportunity to scrutinise such traditional approach and delivered three conflicting judgments. So, what approach should role players now employ, seeing that consensus was not reached in the constitutional court?

In terms of s187(1)(f) of the LRA, a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to, age.

In terms of s187(2)(b) of the LRA, despite s187(1)(f), dismissal, based on age, is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.

What is the approach traditionally adopted where an employer permits an employee to work beyond the normal or agreed-upon retirement age and subsequently wishes to terminate the services of the employee, based on age, and wishes to rely on the defence as set out in s187(2)(b)?