Skip to main content

Article 48/2021

Labour Edge

Does the LRA impose a duty to bargain?


In Bidair Services (Pty) Ltd v Makgoba NO and Others (2019) 30 SALLR 168 (LC), the labour court recently stated the following:

It should be recalled that the basic structure of the LRA is one that does not impose a duty to bargain. Rather, the constitutional right to engage in collective bargaining finds expression in a strong set of organisational rights (those referred to in s12 to s16 of the LRA) and the right to strike in support of a demand that a party be recognised as a collective bargaining agent, or any other element of what the LRA defines as a refusal to bargain.  If the conceptual integrity of this structure is to be maintained (as it must), then commissioners (and judges) must be cautious not to confuse what are two discrete concepts and thus run the risk of imposing a duty to bargain.  The structure of the LRA is one in which commissioners and judges have no role in determining whether one party should bargain collectively with another, the subject matter of any collective bargaining, the level at which bargaining should be conducted, or the identity of any bargaining partner.

The previous article dealt with the distinction between misconduct constituting desertion and misconduct constituting abscondment – see, further, in this regard, Okhahlamba Local Municipality v Mabuya (2021) 32 SALLR 12 (LC).

In this article, what we attempt to do is provide some clarity as to a very different misconduct, namely, the misconduct of deeming desertion.

What is the difference between desertion and abscondment?

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?