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Article 47/2025

The ordinary rule in motion proceedings is that an applicant must stand or fall by its notice of motion and the averments made in its founding affidavit (President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC); Betlane v Shelly Corp CC 2011 (1) SA 388 (CC) and Van der Merwe and Another v Taylor NO and Others 2008 (1) SA 1 (CC)).

Apart from the above restriction in motion proceedings, another restriction is that, generally, such proceedings cannot be used to resolve factual disputes because they are not designed to determine probabilities.

Under what circumstances can a final order be granted in motion proceedings?
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With reference to Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A), the supreme court of appeal, in National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA), held that a final order can only be granted in motion proceedings:

  • if the facts averred in the applicant’s affidavits, which have been admitted by the respondent, together with the facts alleged by the respondent, justify such an order
  • the above is not applicable if the respondent’s version:
    • consists of bald or uncreditworthy denials, or
    • raises fictitious issues of dispute, or
    • is palpably implausible, or
    • is farfetched, or
    • is so clearly untenable that the court is justified in rejecting them merely on the papers

See, further:

  • Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd 2006 (4) SA 326 (SCA), para [55]
  • Thint (Pty) Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others; Zuma v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2009 (1) SA 1 (CC)

Precautionary suspensions

In the public sector, the Senior Management Service Handbook (SMS Handbook) directly addresses precautionary suspensions and the 60-day time limit.

Clause 2.7(2)(c) of the SMS Handbook provides that ‘If a member is suspended or transferred as a precautionary measure, the employer must hold a disciplinary hearing within 60 days. The chair of the hearing must then decide on any further postponement.’

Regulation 6 of the Local Government: Disciplinary Regulations Senior Managers, 2010 (Regulations) provides for the precautionary suspension of senior municipal employees and Regulation 6(6)(a) provides: ‘If a senior is suspended, a disciplinary hearing must commence within three months after the date of suspension, failing which the suspension will automatically lapse.’

What are the principles governing a determination of the question as to whether or not a senior municipal employee’s suspension automatically lapses in terms of the aforesaid Regulation 6(6)(a)?

Obviously, the answers to the aforesaid question are very relevant in the private sector where, firstly, a collective agreement regulates a similar process or, alternatively, such contractual rights have been created between the parties, to be enforced in terms of s77(3) of the BCEA.

In the previous article, we dealt with the consequences of a plant level collective agreement with a definite beginning and end date. We indicated to you that, in line with s23(2) of the LRA, and an analysis of the relevant case law, that, once such a collective agreement reaches its expiry date, it expires and is no longer of any force or effect. In this article, we deal with the scenario where a plant level collective agreement is concluded for an indefinite period and the employer gave notice to terminate same.

What are the consequences when a party to a plant level collective agreement, concluded for an indefinite time period, gives notice to terminate such collective agreement?

In terms of s23(2), a collective agreement binds, for the whole period of the collective agreement, every person so bound in terms of s23(1)(c) (the members of a registered trade union and the employers who are members of a registered employers’ organisation who are a party to the collective agreement, if the collective agreement regulates the terms and conditions of employment, or the conduct of the employers and employees) who was a member at the time it became binding, or who becomes a member after it became binding (irrespective of whether or not that person continues to be a member of such trade union or employers’ organisation for the duration of the collective agreement).

What is the relevant case law development as to a plant level collective agreement that has an expiry date, i e does such collective agreement continue to be of force and effect after such expiry date?