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Article 46/2025

If the cause of action is an alleged breach of an agreement, s77(3), read with s77A(e), of the BCEA is applicable, establishing the concurrent jurisdiction of the labour court and high court to determine the dispute (we have dealt with this scenario in previous articles).

On the other hand, if the cause of action is the alleged non-compliance with the required statutory unfairness so contained in the LRA, then the jurisdiction of the CCMA (and bargaining councils) and the labour court is established in terms of s191 of the LRA (previous articles also dealt with this issue).

But what about if the cause of action is based on a collective agreement?

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It is important to realise that s24 of the LRA is not applicable under all circumstances.

The SCA, in MEC for Economic Development, Environment and Tourism, Limpopo v Leboho (2022) 33 SALLR 281 (SCA); (2022) 43 ILJ 2695 (SCA), adopted the following approach:

  • if the cause of action concerns the interpretation of the collective agreement or, alternatively, entails an application issue of such collective agreement, then s24 of the LRA is applicable See, further, Tshambi v Hospersa (2016) 37 ILJ 1839 (LAC)
  • If, however, on the other hand, the cause of action centres around the enforcement of the collective agreement, or boils down to a compliance issue of the collective agreement, then the civil jurisdiction of the high court comes into play.
November 9, 2026

Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA reads as follows: ‘A dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including but not limited to religion, conscience and belief”.

In terms of s187(2)(a) of the LRA, despite the aforesaid s187(1)(f), a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on the inherent requirements of a particular job.

What approach is to be followed to determine, firstly, whether the reason for the dismissal on the basis of religion, conscience or belief is based upon an inherent requirement of a particular job?

And, secondly, what approach is to be followed to determine whether or not an employer complied with its duty to reasonably accommodate the aforesaid category of employees?

November 2, 2026

In the previous article, we set out the traditional approach to s187(2)(b) of the LRA, covering the scenario where an employee reached the normal or agreed-upon retirement age, but continued to work beyond such age. The constitutional court, in Motor Industry Staff Association and Another v Great South Auto Body CC t/a Great South Panelbeaters (Landman); Solidarity obo Strydom and Others v State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd (Solidarity) – combinedly referred to as Landman; Solidarity – had the opportunity to scrutinise such traditional approach and delivered three conflicting judgments. So, what approach should role players now employ, seeing that consensus was not reached in the constitutional court?

October 26, 2026

In terms of s187(1)(f) of the LRA, a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to, age.

In terms of s187(2)(b) of the LRA, despite s187(1)(f), dismissal, based on age, is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.

What is the approach traditionally adopted where an employer permits an employee to work beyond the normal or agreed-upon retirement age and subsequently wishes to terminate the services of the employee, based on age, and wishes to rely on the defence as set out in s187(2)(b)?