Skip to main content

Article 46/2024

LabourEdge

What is the approach to be adopted to determine whether or not the CCMA (or relevant bargaining council) or the labour court has jurisdiction where a person is dismissed outside the territorial waters of the Republic of South Africa?

_____________________________________

Locality of undertaking where the employee is employed approach

  • The labour appeal court, in Astral Operations v Parry (2008) 29 ILJ 2668 (LAC), followed the approach adopted in Genrec Mei v Industrial Council for Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industry 1995 (1) SA 563 (A), to the effect that the locality of the undertaking where the employee was employed is the determinative factor in establishing the jurisdiction of the CCMA or the labour court.
  • The said approach was subsequently followed in Sorrell v Petroplan (2023) 34 SALLR 3 (LC).

The undertaking outside South Africa considered as separate and divorced from the South African undertaking approach

  • On the other hand, the labour appeal court, in Monare v SA Tourism (2016) 37 ILJ 394 (LAC); (2023) 44 ILJ 894 (LC), adopted a different approach and identified that the real question is an investigation as to whether or not the operation outside South Africa is a separate and divorced operation from the South African operation – a positive answer in the above regard would indicate that the LRA is not applicable, whereas, on the other hand, a negative answer in the above regard would indicate that the LRA is applicable.
  • The aforesaid approach of the labour appeal court was subsequently followed in Robineau v Schenker SA (Pty) Ltd (2020) 31 SALLR 149 (LAC); (2020) 41 ILJ 1648 (LAC).

A different approach applicable to labour brokers?

  • The labour court, in MECS Africa (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others (2014) 35 ILJ 745 (LC), however, indicated that, when considering whether or not the CCMA has jurisdiction to hear disputes referred to it by employees of a South African labour broking service when so placed outside the borders of South Africa, the test to be applied is, in line with the Astral judgment (supra) (LAC), the following: where is the locality of the employer’s undertaking in which the employee works? – seeing that the labour broker conducts its labour broking business at the place where it recruits and procures labour and not the place where its clients have operations, the CCMA, in this case, had jurisdiction over employees of the labour broker employed by the client in the Democratic Republic of Congo
  • The labour court, in Sorrell (supra), disagreed with the approach adopted in the aforesaid judgment.

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?