Article 46/2022

What are the principles governing frequent absenteeism due to illness, so formulated by the labour court in General Motors SA (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA and Others (2018) 39 ILJ 1316 (LC)?

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The labour court summarised the aforesaid principles, dealing with incapacity dismissals based on frequent absenteeism for illness, as follows:

‘[12] Given the applicants grounds for review, it is also necessary to summarise, in brief terms, the legal principles applicable to sick absence. In AECI Explosives Ltd (Zomerveld) v Mambalu (1995) 16 ILJ 1505 (LAC); [1995] 9 BLLR 1 (LAC), the Labour Appeal Court said the following:

“It seems to us that the company, having accepted the authenticity of the medical certificates, was entitled to rely only on incapacity. It was entitled to dismiss the applicant ‘for his incapacity to perform his job where such incapacity [was] due to persistent absence from work because of genuine ill health’ (per Tebbutt J in Hendricks v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co of SA Ltd (1992) 15 ILJ 304 (LAC) at 312I–J). The test for substantive fairness was stated by Tebbutt J at 313A–D to be the following:

‘The substantive fairness of the dismissal depends on the question whether the employer can fairly be expected to continue the employment relationship bearing in mind the interests of the employee and the employer and the equities of the case. Relevant factors would include inter alia the nature of the incapacity; the cause of incapacity; the likelihood of recovery, improvement or recurrence; the period of absence and its effect on the employer’s operations; the effect of the employee’s disability on other employees; and the employee’s work record and length of service.’”’

In terms of s34(1) of the BCEA, an employer may not make deductions from an employee’s remuneration unless, subject to s34(2), the employee agrees, in writing, or the deduction is made in terms of a law, collective agreement, court order or arbitration award.

A case is moot and therefore not justiciable if it no longer presents an existing or live controversy. With reference to National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [1999] ZACC 17; 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC), how did the supreme court of appeal, in Mhlontlo Local Municipality and Others v Ngcangula and Another (2024) 35 SALLR 132 (SCA) recently deal with this issue?

The principle underlying the doctrine of peremption is that no person can be allowed to take up two positions inconsistent with one another, or, as is commonly expressed, to blow hot and cold, to approbate and reprobate when considering pursuing litigation. With reference to Qoboshiyane NO v Avusa Publishing Eastern Cape [2012] ZASCA 166; 2013 (3) SA 315 (SCA), what is the test to be applied to determine whether or not a party has perempted its right to institute legal proceedings?