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Article 46/2022

What are the principles governing frequent absenteeism due to illness, so formulated by the labour court in General Motors SA (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA and Others (2018) 39 ILJ 1316 (LC)?

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The labour court summarised the aforesaid principles, dealing with incapacity dismissals based on frequent absenteeism for illness, as follows:

‘[12] Given the applicants grounds for review, it is also necessary to summarise, in brief terms, the legal principles applicable to sick absence. In AECI Explosives Ltd (Zomerveld) v Mambalu (1995) 16 ILJ 1505 (LAC); [1995] 9 BLLR 1 (LAC), the Labour Appeal Court said the following:

“It seems to us that the company, having accepted the authenticity of the medical certificates, was entitled to rely only on incapacity. It was entitled to dismiss the applicant ‘for his incapacity to perform his job where such incapacity [was] due to persistent absence from work because of genuine ill health’ (per Tebbutt J in Hendricks v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co of SA Ltd (1992) 15 ILJ 304 (LAC) at 312I–J). The test for substantive fairness was stated by Tebbutt J at 313A–D to be the following:

‘The substantive fairness of the dismissal depends on the question whether the employer can fairly be expected to continue the employment relationship bearing in mind the interests of the employee and the employer and the equities of the case. Relevant factors would include inter alia the nature of the incapacity; the cause of incapacity; the likelihood of recovery, improvement or recurrence; the period of absence and its effect on the employer’s operations; the effect of the employee’s disability on other employees; and the employee’s work record and length of service.’”’

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?