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Article 46/2021

Labour Edge

How did the labour court recently, in Jacobson v Vitalab (2019) 30 SALLR 175 (LC), interpret s187(1)(c) of the LRA dealing with the refusal to accept a demand?


The labour court stated that it appeared, from the wording of the amended s187(1)(c) and the explication of its purpose in the Explanatory Memorandum, that the application of the section is limited to the collective sphere. The Explanatory Memorandum makes clear that the purpose of the amended s187(1)(c) is to protect the integrity of the collective bargaining process. It precludes the use of dismissal as a legitimate instrument of coercion in the collective bargaining process. That process, by definition, contemplates concerted action and the participation of more than one employee (see Schoeman and Another v Samsung Electronics (Pty) Ltd [1997] 10 BLLR 1364 (LC)).  For the section to find application, therefore, there must have been an employer demand made of two or more employees, they must have refused to accept that demand and they must have been dismissed in consequence of that refusal (see National Union of Metalworkers of SA obo Members v Aveng Trident Steel (A Division of Aveng Africa) (Pty) Ltd (2018) 39 ILJ 1625 (LC).  The conclusion, that s187(1)(c) was not intended to apply in individual dismissal disputes, was fortified by the wording of the provision itself – the reference was to a ‘refusal by employees to accept a demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest between them and their employer’. The use of the plural makes clear that the extent of the prohibition against dismissal applies only where an employer seeks to extract a concession by employees to demands made in a collective context.

Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA reads as follows: ‘A dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including but not limited to religion, conscience and belief”.

In terms of s187(2)(a) of the LRA, despite the aforesaid s187(1)(f), a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on the inherent requirements of a particular job.

What approach is to be followed to determine, firstly, whether the reason for the dismissal on the basis of religion, conscience or belief is based upon an inherent requirement of a particular job?

And, secondly, what approach is to be followed to determine whether or not an employer complied with its duty to reasonably accommodate the aforesaid category of employees?

In the previous article, we set out the traditional approach to s187(2)(b) of the LRA, covering the scenario where an employee reached the normal or agreed-upon retirement age, but continued to work beyond such age. The constitutional court, in Motor Industry Staff Association and Another v Great South Auto Body CC t/a Great South Panelbeaters (Landman); Solidarity obo Strydom and Others v State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd (Solidarity) – combinedly referred to as Landman; Solidarity – had the opportunity to scrutinise such traditional approach and delivered three conflicting judgments. So, what approach should role players now employ, seeing that consensus was not reached in the constitutional court?

In terms of s187(1)(f) of the LRA, a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to, age.

In terms of s187(2)(b) of the LRA, despite s187(1)(f), dismissal, based on age, is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.

What is the approach traditionally adopted where an employer permits an employee to work beyond the normal or agreed-upon retirement age and subsequently wishes to terminate the services of the employee, based on age, and wishes to rely on the defence as set out in s187(2)(b)?