Article 46/2021

Labour Edge

How did the labour court recently, in Jacobson v Vitalab (2019) 30 SALLR 175 (LC), interpret s187(1)(c) of the LRA dealing with the refusal to accept a demand?


The labour court stated that it appeared, from the wording of the amended s187(1)(c) and the explication of its purpose in the Explanatory Memorandum, that the application of the section is limited to the collective sphere. The Explanatory Memorandum makes clear that the purpose of the amended s187(1)(c) is to protect the integrity of the collective bargaining process. It precludes the use of dismissal as a legitimate instrument of coercion in the collective bargaining process. That process, by definition, contemplates concerted action and the participation of more than one employee (see Schoeman and Another v Samsung Electronics (Pty) Ltd [1997] 10 BLLR 1364 (LC)).  For the section to find application, therefore, there must have been an employer demand made of two or more employees, they must have refused to accept that demand and they must have been dismissed in consequence of that refusal (see National Union of Metalworkers of SA obo Members v Aveng Trident Steel (A Division of Aveng Africa) (Pty) Ltd (2018) 39 ILJ 1625 (LC).  The conclusion, that s187(1)(c) was not intended to apply in individual dismissal disputes, was fortified by the wording of the provision itself – the reference was to a ‘refusal by employees to accept a demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest between them and their employer’. The use of the plural makes clear that the extent of the prohibition against dismissal applies only where an employer seeks to extract a concession by employees to demands made in a collective context.

In terms of s34(1) of the BCEA, an employer may not make deductions from an employee’s remuneration unless, subject to s34(2), the employee agrees, in writing, or the deduction is made in terms of a law, collective agreement, court order or arbitration award.

A case is moot and therefore not justiciable if it no longer presents an existing or live controversy. With reference to National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [1999] ZACC 17; 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC), how did the supreme court of appeal, in Mhlontlo Local Municipality and Others v Ngcangula and Another (2024) 35 SALLR 132 (SCA) recently deal with this issue?

The principle underlying the doctrine of peremption is that no person can be allowed to take up two positions inconsistent with one another, or, as is commonly expressed, to blow hot and cold, to approbate and reprobate when considering pursuing litigation. With reference to Qoboshiyane NO v Avusa Publishing Eastern Cape [2012] ZASCA 166; 2013 (3) SA 315 (SCA), what is the test to be applied to determine whether or not a party has perempted its right to institute legal proceedings?