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Article 45/2025

Prior to 2018, if an employee wanted to institute action against an employer for monies owed to such employee in terms of a contract of employment, there was only one route available to such employee, namely, to institute action against the employer ito s77(3), read with s77A(e) of the BCEA. The BCEA Amendment Act of 2018 changed all of that. It also changed the alternative dispute-resolution methods to be utilised when money is owed in terms of the National Minimum Wage Act (NMWA), a sectoral determination or a collective agreement, by means of the introduction of s73A. What are the current dispute-resolution paths in the above regard?

What are the current dispute-resolution paths in the above regard?

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EMPLOYEE OR WORKER EARNING ABOVE THE THRESHOLD ito s6(3) OF THE BCEA

  • If there is a dispute about monies owed in terms of a contract of employment, the NMWA, a sectoral determination or a collective agreement, the following dispute- resolution paths are available to the employee:
    • labour court
    • high court
    • magistrate’s court
    • small claims court (currently not operative)

IF MONIES ARE OWED ITO THE NMWA, A CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT, SECTORAL DETERMINATION OR COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT AND THE EMPLOYEE OR WORKER EARNS BELOW THE THRESHOLD ITO S6(3) OF THE BCEA

  • The dispute-resolution path is compulsory con-arb at the CCMA.

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?