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Article 45/2024

LabourEdge

The labour appeal court recently had the opportunity to identify the different approaches that could be adopted to compulsory interest arbitration in terms of s74(4) of the LRA in respect of essential services – what were these options and on what basis would an arbitrator decide which one is more appropriate than others in a specific scenario?

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  • The labour appeal court, in Working on Fire (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA and Others (2022) 43 ILJ 2764 (LAC); [2023] 1 BLLR 39 (LAC); (2022) 33 SALLR 64 (LAC), approached the above issues as follows:
    • in the scenario where the parties do not agree to an arbitrator’s terms of reference and it is left to the arbitrator to determine, in terms of s136(4) of the LRA, the arbitrator has to ascertain the applicable rule of law or legal questions available to him or her – this is a question of law
    • the arbitrator has to make a value judgment as to which of the options listed below are best suited to resolve the dispute before him or her – this is a matter of discretion and not a question of law
  • The labour appeal court, in the aforesaid matter, identified the following three options available to an arbitrator in the aforesaid scenarios, namely:
    • the hypothetical outcome approach (NEHAWU v Lifecare Health [1999] 2 BALR 153 (CCMA)) – this approach entails the arbitrator anticipating where bargaining should have been struck had the bargaining continued to conclusion and in good faith
    • the fairness approach (SAMWU v Water and Sanitation Services SA (Pty) Ltd [2002] 1 BALR 89 (CCMA)) – this approach entails that the arbitrator is to be persuaded on the basis of fairness, which respective case should be accepted and the arbitrator is to investigate whether the respective parties had proffered sufficient reasons for the acceptance of their respective positions
    • final offer position/approach (NUMSA v Working on Fire [2018] 10 BALR 1082 (CCMA)) – the arbitrator has no choice but to decide between the respective final proposals of the parties, with no discretion to merely split the difference between the final positions

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?