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Article 44/2024

LabourEdge

Section 188A(11) of the LRA reads as follows: ‘Despite subsection (1), if an employee alleges in good faith that the holding of an enquiry contravenes the Protected Disclosures Act, 2000 (Act 26 of 2000), that employee or the employer may require that an enquiry be conducted in terms of this section into allegations by the employer into the conduct or capacity of the employee.’

In the scenario where an employer has instituted disciplinary action against the employee, what are the jurisdictional pre-conditions to be met before s188A(11) of the LRA could be applicable?

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  • In terms of the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 (‘the Act’), disclosure means disclosure of information regarding any conduct of the employer or employee, made by an employee who has reason to believe that the information shows or tends to show, inter alia, an impropriety (e g a criminal offence having been committed or likely to be committed, or a person failing, or likely to fail, to comply with legal obligations).
  • In terms of s9 of the Act, any disclosure made in good faith by an employee is protected if the following conditions are met:
    • the employee who makes it reasonably believes that the information disclosed and the allegations contained in it are substantially fair
    • the disclosure is not made for personal gain, excluding any reward payable, and
    • in all circumstances it is reasonable to make a disclosure
  • In terms of the Act, ‘occupational detriment’ means, inter alia, being subject to any disciplinary action, being dismissed, suspended, demoted, harassed or intimidated, being transferred against his/her will, etc.
  • The requirement of good faith entails that the allegation of contravention must have the element of honesty and sincerity – the contravention must exist prima facie
  • The labour court, in Mulaudzi v Property Practitioners Regulatory Authority (2023) 34 SALLR 77 (LC), identified the following jurisdictional preconditions before an employee may invoke s188A(11):
    • the employee must have made a protected disclosure (a disclosure made to a legal adviser (s5), employer (s6), member of cabinet or executive council of province (s7), public protector or auditor general (s8)) – thereafter, the employer must have subjected the employee, who made the protected disclosure, to occupational detriment
    • once subjected to occupational detriment, the employee has to allege, honestly and sincerely, that a causal connection exists between his/her protected disclosure and the occupational detriment meted out by the employer
    • if any of the jurisdictional facts are absent, the relevant bargaining council, accredited agency or the CCMA lacks the jurisdiction to entertain the request that the enquiry be conducted
  • The labour court, in the aforesaid matter, also indicated the following:
    • if the CCMA, accredited agency or bargaining council accede to the request to utilise s188A(11), without the jurisdictional requirements having been met, the employer may review the decision in terms of s158(1)(g) of the LRA, on the grounds of legality (Nxele v National Commissioner: Department of Correctional Services and Others (2018) 39 ILJ 1799 (LC); Jacobs and Others v National Commissioner of SAPS and Another (J194/21)
    • the request to conduct an enquiry in terms of s188A(11) does not terminate the internal disciplinary hearing – same is only terminated once the decision has been made by the body to accede to the establishment of such enquiry on the basis of the jurisdictional requirements having been met
  • The fact that an employee is entitled to relief when an employer metes out occupational detriment, in terms of s186(2) of the LRA, does not exclude such employee from also utilising his/her civil remedies and this entails:
    • the utilisation of the actio legis aquiliae to recover patrimonial losses, and
    • the utilisation of the actio iniuriarum to claim non-patrimonial losses for injuries to the employee’s reputation (fama and self-worth (dignitas))

Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA reads as follows: ‘A dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including but not limited to religion, conscience and belief”.

In terms of s187(2)(a) of the LRA, despite the aforesaid s187(1)(f), a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on the inherent requirements of a particular job.

What approach is to be followed to determine, firstly, whether the reason for the dismissal on the basis of religion, conscience or belief is based upon an inherent requirement of a particular job?

And, secondly, what approach is to be followed to determine whether or not an employer complied with its duty to reasonably accommodate the aforesaid category of employees?

In the previous article, we set out the traditional approach to s187(2)(b) of the LRA, covering the scenario where an employee reached the normal or agreed-upon retirement age, but continued to work beyond such age. The constitutional court, in Motor Industry Staff Association and Another v Great South Auto Body CC t/a Great South Panelbeaters (Landman); Solidarity obo Strydom and Others v State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd (Solidarity) – combinedly referred to as Landman; Solidarity – had the opportunity to scrutinise such traditional approach and delivered three conflicting judgments. So, what approach should role players now employ, seeing that consensus was not reached in the constitutional court?

In terms of s187(1)(f) of the LRA, a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to, age.

In terms of s187(2)(b) of the LRA, despite s187(1)(f), dismissal, based on age, is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.

What is the approach traditionally adopted where an employer permits an employee to work beyond the normal or agreed-upon retirement age and subsequently wishes to terminate the services of the employee, based on age, and wishes to rely on the defence as set out in s187(2)(b)?