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Article 44/2023

How should an employee be dealt with if tested positive for being under the influence of cannabis?

Has the decriminalisation of the use of cannabis in private surroundings had any effect on the approach to be adopted

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  • It is recommended that a difference should be made between an employee dependent on cannabis and an employee not dependent on cannabis
  • if an employee is dependent on cannabis, the matter should be dealt with as incapacity: ill-health, entailing, inter alia, that items 10 and 11 of Schedule 8 to the LRA should be taken into account
  • on the other hand, if an employee is not dependent on cannabis and wilfully disregards the workplace rules, such conduct may constitute misconduct – under the misconduct scenario, items 1 to 5 and 7 of Schedule 8 to the LRA should be taken into account
  • the aforesaid approach should also be applied in respect of alcohol and other drugs

(see, inter alia, Mthembu and Others v NCT Durban Wood Chips KNDB 4091-18 and Transnet Freight Rail v Transport Bargaining Council (2011) 32 ILJ 1766 (LC))

Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA reads as follows: ‘A dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including but not limited to religion, conscience and belief”.

In terms of s187(2)(a) of the LRA, despite the aforesaid s187(1)(f), a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on the inherent requirements of a particular job.

What approach is to be followed to determine, firstly, whether the reason for the dismissal on the basis of religion, conscience or belief is based upon an inherent requirement of a particular job?

And, secondly, what approach is to be followed to determine whether or not an employer complied with its duty to reasonably accommodate the aforesaid category of employees?

In the previous article, we set out the traditional approach to s187(2)(b) of the LRA, covering the scenario where an employee reached the normal or agreed-upon retirement age, but continued to work beyond such age. The constitutional court, in Motor Industry Staff Association and Another v Great South Auto Body CC t/a Great South Panelbeaters (Landman); Solidarity obo Strydom and Others v State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd (Solidarity) – combinedly referred to as Landman; Solidarity – had the opportunity to scrutinise such traditional approach and delivered three conflicting judgments. So, what approach should role players now employ, seeing that consensus was not reached in the constitutional court?

In terms of s187(1)(f) of the LRA, a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to, age.

In terms of s187(2)(b) of the LRA, despite s187(1)(f), dismissal, based on age, is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.

What is the approach traditionally adopted where an employer permits an employee to work beyond the normal or agreed-upon retirement age and subsequently wishes to terminate the services of the employee, based on age, and wishes to rely on the defence as set out in s187(2)(b)?