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Article 42/2025

What are the different stages when unfair discrimination is alleged to exist on a listed ground ito s6(1) of the EEA as opposed to the different stages applicable where unfair discrimination is alleged to exist on an arbitrary ground ito s6(1) of the EEA?

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DIFFERENT STAGES TO BE APPLIED WHERE UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION IS ALLEGED TO EXIST ON A LISTED GROUND, ito s6(1) OF THE EEA: APPLICATION OF s11(1) OF THE EEA

Stage 1

  1. It is required that the complainant must allege discrimination on a listed ground ito s6(1) of the EEA.
  2. If the complainant complies with this requirement, then the matter proceeds to stage 2.
  3. If the complainant does not comply with this requirement, then the process ‘stops here’ and the complaint is bad in law.

Stage 2

In this stage, the onus is on the employer to prove, on a balance or probabilities:

  • that discrimination as alleged did not take place at all, or
  • that discrimination did take place but it is rational and not unfair, or otherwise justifiable

If the employer discharged the onus, then it is the end of the process and the complaint has not been established on a balance of probabilities.

On the other hand, if the employer does not discharge the onus, then unfair discrimination has been established and the complainant is successful.

DIFFERENT STAGES TO BE ADOPTED WHERE UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION IS ALLEGED TO EXIST ON AN ARBITRARY GROUND ito s6(1) OF THE EEA: APPLICATION OF s11(2) OF THE EEA

Stage 1

The complainant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that:

  • the conduct is irrational and
  • the conduct amounts to discrimination and
  • the discrimination is unfair

(in essence, an application of the test as set out in Harksen v Lane NO and Others 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC))

If the complainant discharges the above onus, then unfair discrimination is established.

On the other hand, if the complainant does not discharge the aforesaid onus, then the complaint is bad in law (and that is the end of the process).

See, further, Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC); Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd v Workers Against Regression (2016) 27 SALLR 125 (LC).

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?