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Article 42/2024

LabourEdge

Is a commissioner empowered to proceed with an arbitration involving a dispute referred to in terms of s191(5)(a) of the LRA, despite an objection by the other party to the dispute, but in non-compliance with rule 17(2) of the CCMA rules?

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  • In terms of rule 17(2) of the CCMA rules, a party, that intends to object to a dispute being dealt with in terms of s191(5A), must deliver a written notice to the CCMA and the other party, at least seven days prior to the scheduled date of the con-arb hearing.
  • In terms of s191(5A) of the LRA, the CCMA, or the relevant bargaining council, must commence the arbitration immediately after certifying that the dispute remains unresolved if:
    • the dismissal relates to probation, or
    • the unfair labour practice relates to probation, or
    • there is no objection for the matter to proceed immediately to arbitration
  • The labour court, in Valinor Trading 133 CC t/a Kings Castle v CCMA and Others (2023) 44 ILJ 1106 (LC); (2023) 34 SALLR 13 (LC), adopted the following approach to the aforesaid issues:
    • s34 of the Constitution guarantees everyone to have any dispute, that can be resolved by application of law, decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum
    • it is wrong to interpret s191(5A)(c) of the LRA to mean that any objection raised outside the prescribed period in rule 17(2) of the CCMA rules ceases to be an objection
    • rule 35(1) of the CCMA rules provides the CCMA and the commissioner with a wide discretion to condone any failure to comply, on good cause shown, and this discretion is to be utilised when there is non-compliance with the seven-day time period as set out in rule 17(2) of the CCMA rules – it does not follow that non-compliance with the seven-day requirement in rule 17(2) renders defective an objection to the point that it can be ignored
  • In response to this judgment, the Director of the CCMA, on 6 April 2023, issued a directive indicating, inter alia, that rule 17(2) remains in force, but any failure with the seven-day time period can be condoned, on good cause shown.

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?