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Article 42/2023

From article 41/2023, it is evident that a successful applicant in terms of an unfair discrimination claim (evaluated in terms of the EEA) is entitled to both compensation and damages, whereas, if the claim was considered in terms of the LRA (on the basis of being an automatically unfair dismissal in terms of s187(1)(f) of the LRA) the employee would not be entitled to a damages claim.

What is the distinction between compensation and damages awarded in terms of the EEA and compensation awarded for an automatically unfair dismissal in terms of the LRA?

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In BMW (SA) (Pty) Ltd v NUM (2020) 31 SALLR 119 (LAC), the labour appeal court distinguished between the following two scenarios:

an automatically unfair dismissal in terms of s187(1)(f) of the LRA

  • compensation (and not damages) is the appropriate remedy in terms of s194(3) of the LRA
  • such compensation is required to be just and equitable under all circumstances but, in any case, must amount to no more than 24 months’ remuneration

unfair discrimination in terms of the EEA (when s6 of the EEA is applicable)

  • firstly, the successful applicant is entitled to a damages claim – for the actual or potential monetary loss (i e patrimonial loss)
  • apart from the damages claim, the successful applicant is also entitled to a compensation claim – as a solatium (non-patrimonial loss) for the insult/humiliation/indignity/hurt, etc suffered

(see, further, SA Airways (Pty) Ltd v Janse van Vuuren (2014) 35 ILJ 2774 (LAC)

November 9, 2026

Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA reads as follows: ‘A dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including but not limited to religion, conscience and belief”.

In terms of s187(2)(a) of the LRA, despite the aforesaid s187(1)(f), a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on the inherent requirements of a particular job.

What approach is to be followed to determine, firstly, whether the reason for the dismissal on the basis of religion, conscience or belief is based upon an inherent requirement of a particular job?

And, secondly, what approach is to be followed to determine whether or not an employer complied with its duty to reasonably accommodate the aforesaid category of employees?

November 2, 2026

In the previous article, we set out the traditional approach to s187(2)(b) of the LRA, covering the scenario where an employee reached the normal or agreed-upon retirement age, but continued to work beyond such age. The constitutional court, in Motor Industry Staff Association and Another v Great South Auto Body CC t/a Great South Panelbeaters (Landman); Solidarity obo Strydom and Others v State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd (Solidarity) – combinedly referred to as Landman; Solidarity – had the opportunity to scrutinise such traditional approach and delivered three conflicting judgments. So, what approach should role players now employ, seeing that consensus was not reached in the constitutional court?

October 26, 2026

In terms of s187(1)(f) of the LRA, a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to, age.

In terms of s187(2)(b) of the LRA, despite s187(1)(f), dismissal, based on age, is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.

What is the approach traditionally adopted where an employer permits an employee to work beyond the normal or agreed-upon retirement age and subsequently wishes to terminate the services of the employee, based on age, and wishes to rely on the defence as set out in s187(2)(b)?