Skip to main content

Article 41/2022

A reinstatement order does not in itself reinstate an employee.  How did the labour appeal court recently, in Kubeka and Others v Ni-Da Transport (Pty) Ltd (2021) 32 SALLR 14 (LAC), determine the consequences of such order and how is such reinstatement order enforced?

_____________________________________

Following the approach adopted in NUM obo Fohlisa v Hendor (2017) 28 SALLR 2 (CC); (2017) 38 ILJ 1560 (CC), the labour appeal court, in the Kubeka judgment, adopted the following approach:

  • in respect of an unfairly dismissed employee, such employee’s employment contract is terminated by dismissal
  • the effect of a reinstatement order is that it does not restore the employment contract and there is no automatic claim for back pay/future pay
  • the reinstatement order simply directs the employee to tender his/her service and the employer to accept such tender – entailing that, in essence, the employer reinstates the employee and not the order
  • in the scenario where the employee tenders his or her services and the employer refuses to accept such tender, there is no restoration of the employment contract – the employer will be compelled to comply with the order by means of instituting contempt proceedings (on the basis that the obligation to accept such tender is an order ad factum praestandum
  • in the scenario where the employee fails to tender his/her service, the contract is not restored and he/she cannot claim back pay/future pay

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?