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Article 41/2021

Labour Edge

Does merely being employed on the basis of a series of fixed-term contracts, without more, create a reasonable expectation in terms of s186(1)(b) of the LRA?


The provisions of s186(1)(b) of the LRA were interpreted in University of Pretoria v CCMA and Others (2012) 33 ILJ 183 (LAC) (Davis JA) as follows:

‘[18]   The words employed in s186 envisage that two requirements must be met in order for an employer’s action to constitute a dismissal:

  • a reasonable expectation on the part of the employee that a fixed term contract on the same or similar terms will be renewed; and
  • a failure by the employer to renew the contract on the same terms or a failure to renew it at all.

These words do not however carry the meaning which is urged by third respondent, namely that, by being employed on the basis of a series of fixed terms contracts, an employee has without more a reasonable expectation of a permanent appointment. The distinction between the fixed term contract and a permanent contract has a clear economic rationale. An employer in the position of appellant may have discretionary funds for a limited period. During this period, it offers a series of fixed term contracts to a particular employee. At some point these funds are depleted and the employer can no longer afford a further fixed term contract. By contrast, the creation of a permanent post would necessitate a more permanent source of funding”

[21]    The words chosen by the legislature, absent an amendment to the legislation, cannot carry the burden of third respondent’s case in that it covers a restrictive set of circumstances, namely a reasonable expectation of a renewal of that which had previously governed the employment relationship, namely a fixed term contract which had previously been enjoyed, which had now expired and, by virtue of the factual matrix created, at best, a reasonable expectation of a renewal.’

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?