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Article 4/2023

What are some of the guidelines to be taken into account to determine the degree of disability when an employee sustained an injury at the workplace?

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In Department of Labour: Compensation Commissioner v Botha (2022) 3 SALLR 17 (SCA), our
supreme court of appeal, inter alia, adopted the following approach:

  • it is important to realise that, in terms of s49(2)(a) of COIDA, if an employee sustained an injury
    in Schedule 2, such employee is presumed to be permanently disabled to the degree as set out
    in the second column
  • what is the meaning of the sixth item in the first column of Schedule 2, to the effect that, if an
    employee suffered an injury not listed in such schedule, he would be deemed to be 100%
    disabled?

    • the SCA indicated that not every injury not listed in Schedule 2 entails a 100% disablement
      and the extent of disability falling outside of Schedule 2 must be determined in the light of
      the specific facts of the specific case and according to medical evidence

November 9, 2026

Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA reads as follows: ‘A dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including but not limited to religion, conscience and belief”.

In terms of s187(2)(a) of the LRA, despite the aforesaid s187(1)(f), a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on the inherent requirements of a particular job.

What approach is to be followed to determine, firstly, whether the reason for the dismissal on the basis of religion, conscience or belief is based upon an inherent requirement of a particular job?

And, secondly, what approach is to be followed to determine whether or not an employer complied with its duty to reasonably accommodate the aforesaid category of employees?

November 2, 2026

In the previous article, we set out the traditional approach to s187(2)(b) of the LRA, covering the scenario where an employee reached the normal or agreed-upon retirement age, but continued to work beyond such age. The constitutional court, in Motor Industry Staff Association and Another v Great South Auto Body CC t/a Great South Panelbeaters (Landman); Solidarity obo Strydom and Others v State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd (Solidarity) – combinedly referred to as Landman; Solidarity – had the opportunity to scrutinise such traditional approach and delivered three conflicting judgments. So, what approach should role players now employ, seeing that consensus was not reached in the constitutional court?

October 26, 2026

In terms of s187(1)(f) of the LRA, a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to, age.

In terms of s187(2)(b) of the LRA, despite s187(1)(f), dismissal, based on age, is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.

What is the approach traditionally adopted where an employer permits an employee to work beyond the normal or agreed-upon retirement age and subsequently wishes to terminate the services of the employee, based on age, and wishes to rely on the defence as set out in s187(2)(b)?