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Article 38/2023

How is compensation to be calculated when a dismissal is only procedurally unfair – i e when section 193(2)(d) of the LRA is applicable?

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In Zeda Car Leasing (Pty) Ltd t/a Avis Fleet v Van Dyk (2020) 31 SALLR 51 (LAC), the labour appeal court adopted the following approach:

  • the compensation must be just and equitable in all circumstances (see s194(1) of the LRA
  • with reference to Johnson & Johnson v CWIU (1999) 20 ILJ 89 (LAC), the following factors are
    relevant:

    • actual loss or patrimonial loss is irrelevant
    • the award is indeed a solatium (as a redress)
    • amongst other things, the following are relevant: the extent of deviation from the required procedure, the employee’s conduct, the employee’s length of service and the anxiety and hurt suffered by the employee

(see, further, Alpha Plant v Simmonds [2001] 3 BLLR 361 (LAC), ARB Electrical Wholesalers v Hibbert (2015) 36 ILJ 2989 (LAC) and Lorentzen v Senachem (Pty) Ltd [1998] 8 BLLR 814 (LC)

It appears that an appeal court will only interfere if the irregularity or the misdirection entails either the ignoring of relevant facts or, alternatively, whether or not the compensation was based on inadequate facts (see, further, Road Accident Fund v Guedes 2006 (5) SA 583 (SCA).

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?