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Article 38/2021

Labour Edge

What are the consequences of an employer electing to consult with non-union members?


An example of looking ‘beyond the Act’ occurred in SA Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union and Another v Amalgamated Retailers (2002) 23 ILJ 165 (LC), where the employer elected to also consult with non-union members.  In this regard, Van Niekerk AJ held:

‘[25]   Section 189 of the LRA requires consultation with a defined consulting partner.  The hierarchy established by s189(1) establishes the identity of that partner.  It is entirely possible, in the discharge of an obligation under s189, that an individual employee is never directly advised that his or her continued employment is in jeopardy.  This is the consequence of a deliberate recognition by the Act of the primacy of the rights accorded to trade unions, workplace forums, and ad hoc employee representatives in the consultation process.

[26]    …However, in this instance, the respondent decided to initiate and conduct a separate consultation with non-union members, and to meet with these employees on an individual basis to discuss with [them] matters relating to the proposed restructuring and their security of employment.  Having elected to do so, it was incumbent on the respondent to interact with each employee with a view to reaching consensus on his or her proposed retrenchment, and the fairness of the respondent’s actions must accordingly be determined on the basis of its stated intentions.

[27]    I wish to emphasize that I reach this conclusion on the facts of this case and in the light of the respondent’s stated intentions.  It is not a general proposition concerning the rights of individual employees in a consultation process.  Given the primacy accorded to collective engagement with a trade union, a workplace forum or the representatives of employees accorded by s189(1) and to which I have referred above, it is entirely feasible that an employer may discharge its obligations in terms of that section without engaging in separate consultation with affected individual employees.  Baloyi’s case is an example of such an instance.’

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?