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Article 35/2023

What is the rationale for awarding compensation?

What are the types of factors to be taken into account to determine whether compensation should be awarded?

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In McGregor v Public Health and Social Development Sectoral Bargaining Council and Others (2021) 32 SALLR 33 (CC), the constitutional court, with reference to, inter alia, Rawlins v Kemp t/a Centralmed (2010) 31 ILJ 2325 (SCA), identified the rationale for compensation as follows:

  • it gives meaning to the right not to be unfairly dismissed and discourages a shotgun approach
  • it recognises the right to be heard before any action is taken by the employer
  • it recognises the employee’s worth as a person

In respect of the factors to be taken into account to determine whether compensation should be awarded, the constitutional court, in McGregor, provided the following non-exhaustive list:

  • the courts are more in favour of awarding compensation than not where the dismissal is both substantively and procedurally unfair than where the dismissal is only substantively or procedurally unfair
  • the nature and extent of deviation from procedural fairness requirements also plays a role – the lesser the deviation, the greater chance of no compensation, whereas the more serious the deviation the stronger the chance of compensation
  • the reason for dismissal also plays a role as well as the employee’s guilt or innocence and the appropriateness of the sanction
  • if the dismissal is only procedurally unfair, there is a discretion not to award compensation at all or to award the appropriate compensation

(Johnson & Johnson v CWIU (1999) 20 ILJ 89 (LAC))

Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA reads as follows: ‘A dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including but not limited to religion, conscience and belief”.

In terms of s187(2)(a) of the LRA, despite the aforesaid s187(1)(f), a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on the inherent requirements of a particular job.

What approach is to be followed to determine, firstly, whether the reason for the dismissal on the basis of religion, conscience or belief is based upon an inherent requirement of a particular job?

And, secondly, what approach is to be followed to determine whether or not an employer complied with its duty to reasonably accommodate the aforesaid category of employees?

In the previous article, we set out the traditional approach to s187(2)(b) of the LRA, covering the scenario where an employee reached the normal or agreed-upon retirement age, but continued to work beyond such age. The constitutional court, in Motor Industry Staff Association and Another v Great South Auto Body CC t/a Great South Panelbeaters (Landman); Solidarity obo Strydom and Others v State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd (Solidarity) – combinedly referred to as Landman; Solidarity – had the opportunity to scrutinise such traditional approach and delivered three conflicting judgments. So, what approach should role players now employ, seeing that consensus was not reached in the constitutional court?

In terms of s187(1)(f) of the LRA, a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to, age.

In terms of s187(2)(b) of the LRA, despite s187(1)(f), dismissal, based on age, is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.

What is the approach traditionally adopted where an employer permits an employee to work beyond the normal or agreed-upon retirement age and subsequently wishes to terminate the services of the employee, based on age, and wishes to rely on the defence as set out in s187(2)(b)?