Article 34/2023

The constitutional court, in McGregor v Public Health and Social Development Sectoral Bargaining Council and Others (2021) 32 SALLR 33 (CC), identified the different discretions applicable when an arbitrator, firstly, makes the decision to award compensation and, secondly, determines the amount of compensation – not to be confused with the amount of back pay which was covered in articles 32/2023 and 33/2023.

What are the principles to be extracted from this judgment of the constitutional court that would be applicable during arbitrations and court proceedings when dealing with the issue of compensation?

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With reference to, inter alia, Rawlins v Kemp t/a Centralmed (2010) 31 ILJ 2325 (SCA); [2012] 1 BLLR 9 (SCA), the constitutional court had the following to say in respect of the discretion to be exercised when considering compensation:

the application of s193(1)(c) of the LRA

  • an application of this statutory provision finds application as to the arbitrator’s or court’s decision to award compensation, and not determining the amount of compensation
  • this entails the exercise of a judicial discretion – entailing that the reviewing or appeal body’s power to interfere is not limited and that it can come to its own decision on the merits
  • whether or not such judicial discretion has been correctly exercised entails an application of the
    reasonable decision-maker test

(see, further, Campbell v Simmers (2016) 37 ILJ 116 (LAC))

an application of s194 of the LRA

  • an application of this section is required to determine the amount of compensation
  • this entails the exercise of a narrow discretion, meaning that the reviewing or appeal body will only interfere on limited grounds with such amount
  • such limited grounds of interference have been identified by the constitutional court in National Coalition of Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) as to include the following:
    • the discretion was not exercised judicially
    • the decision-maker was influenced by wrong principles
    • the decision-maker was misdirected on the facts
    • the decision was not one that could reasonably have been made with reference to the relevant facts and applicable principles

What is an employer to do when it suspects that a medical practitioner is issuing pre- signed sick notes, or permitting its employees to buy sick notes, or, alternatively, is engaging in some other dubious practice regarding the issue of sick notes? What is an employer to do when it suspects that a person is not entitled to practice as a medical doctor?

Are you required to interpret any of the following: pre-trial minutes, strike ballot guidelines, the LRA, a separation agreement, a benefits dispute, an arbitration award, the BCEA, a restraint of trade, a traditional disciplinary enquiry charge sheet, the constitution of a trade union, etc?

The labour appeal court recently, in Murray and Roberts Cementation (Pty) Ltd v AMCU obo Dube and Others (2024) 35 SALLR 116 (LAC), confirmed important principles relating to the formulation of traditional charge sheets, determining the
fairness of a dismissal, the interpretation of a charge sheet and the reason(s) relied upon by the employer to justify the dismissal of an employee.