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Article 33/2022

The labour appeal court recently ruled that an employer cannot rely at arbitration on a reason for dismissal different from the reason for dismissal utilised internally.  What are the considerations to be taken into account in coming to such a conclusion and what are the consequences of this judgment?

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In Samancor Chrome Ltd (Eastern Chrome Mines) v CCMA and Others (2020) 31 SALLR 142 (LAC), the labour appeal court identified the following relevant principles:

  • an employer should notify the employee of any allegation of misconduct ‘using a form and language that the employee can reasonably understand’ (item 4(1), Schedule 8 Code of Good Practice: Dismissal)
  • while it is immaterial what label is given to the misconduct alleged, notice should be given in a manner which provides a reasonable degree of clarity so as to enable the employee to answer to the allegation raised (see Zeelie v Price Forbes (Northern Province) (1) (2001) 22 ILJ 2053 (LC), at 2063A-C; Mutual Construction Co Tvl (Pty) Ltd v Ntombela NO and Others [2009] ZALAC 14; (2010) 31 ILJ 901 (LAC); [2010] 5 BLLR 513 (LAC), at paragraph [41])
  • the arbitration hearing was one de novo with there being no bar on relevant additional evidence being adduced at arbitration.  This was so since the determination of the fairness of a dismissal at arbitration ‘is not reached with reference to the evidential material that was before the employer at the time of its decision but on the basis of all the evidential material before the arbitrator’ (County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (1999) 20 ILJ 1701 (LAC); [1999] 11 BLLR 1117 (LAC), at paragraph [11]
  • it is, however, not open to an employer to alter or amend the reason for dismissal or to rely on an entirely different reason for such dismissal at arbitration, and there was no merit in the appellant’s submission that the employee’s misconduct ‘must be viewed through the prism of the contextualised version during the course of the domestic hearing and subsequent arbitration proceedings’.  To the extent that this suggested that it was permissible for the reason for dismissal to morph from that advanced by the employer at the time of dismissal to a different reason advanced at arbitration, this was simply not the case

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?