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Article 27/2025

Recently, the labour court and the Public Health and Social Development Sectoral Bargaining Council (the bargaining council) had the opportunity to deal with the following different suspensions:

  • precautionary suspension on full pay
  • punitive suspension on no pay
  • suspension where the employee loses registration with a controlling body
  • precautionary suspension without pay
  • unlawful precautionary suspension

The purpose of this article is to, firstly, analyse the latest developments in the above regard and, secondly, to determine some of the principles so applicable to each potential type of suspension.

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Precautionary suspension on full pay

  • This type of suspension is covered by s186(2)(b) of the LRA.
  • One of the leading cases in this regard is Aminto Precast and Civil Engineering CC v CCMA and Others [2023] 6 BLLR 521 (LC) (Aminto) – so referred to by Arbitrator Makhanya in National Public Service Workers Union obo Lamprecht v Department of Health KwaZulu-Natal (unreported case number PSHS105-23/24) (Lamprecht).

Punitive suspension on no pay

  • Again, this type of suspension is covered by s186(2)(b) of the LRA.
  • Again, one of the leading cases is Aminto (LC), so referred to in Lamprecht (Bargaining Council award).

Where the employee is suspended because he/she lost registration with a controlling body

  • In Lamprecht (supra), the scenario was as follows: registration with the controlling body is an inherent requirement for an employee to perform his/her duties – such body being the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA), seeing that the employee was employed as an emergency care services shift leader. The employee lost the registration because the employee did not pay the relevant fees and, thus, the relevant licence held by the employee had expired.
  • Lamprecht (supra) ruled that, should the employer suspend the employee under the above circumstances (because he lost registration with the relevant controlling body), this does not amount to suspension contemplated in terms of s186(2)(b) of the LRA – seeing that s186(2)(b) of the LRA only provides for two types of suspensions, namely, a precautionary suspension and a punitive suspension.
  • So, on what basis can the employer challenge the inability of the employee to perform his/her services in this regard? – it is submitted that such basis is the ground of a supervening impossibility of performance, as set out in National Union of Mineworkers and Another v Samancor (2011) 32 ILJ 1618 (SCA), also applicable to the following scenarios:
    • imprisonment
    • military call-up
    • closed shop
    • any other legal prohibition on employment

Precautionary suspension without pay

  • This type of suspension is also covered by s186(2)(b) of the LRA.
  • The labour court, per Prinsloo J (in Strydom v Arcelormittal SA (2024) 35 SALLR 131 (CC)) (Strydom), expressed the viewpoint that, where an employee unreasonably delays the matter being proceeded with and has no intention of constructively participating in the investigation, the employer may be permitted to alter a precautionary suspension with pay to one without pay.
  • A procedural fairness requirement identified by the LC is that the employer may require the employee to submit reasons as to why the suspension should not be changed from a ‘with pay’ scenario to a ‘without pay’ scenario.
  • The above approach exists on the basis that a value judgment is to be made and such possibility be implemented if it is fair under all circumstances.

Unlawful precautionary suspension

  • This type of suspension is not catered for in section 187(b) of the LRA.
  • With reference to Chezi v SA Police Service and Others (2021) 42 ILJ 184 (LC), where it was held that, for the LC to have jurisdiction, the applicant is to identify the specific statutory provisions (in terms of the LRA or any other law) which confirm such jurisdiction, it was held in Strydom that there are no provisions in the LRA permitting the LC to have jurisdiction over an alleged unlawful precautionary suspension.

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?