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Article 26/2023

The constitutional court recently, in McGregor v Public Health and Social Development Sectoral Bargaining Council (2021) 32 SALLR 33 (CC), had the opportunity to deal with the perception that, once a finding is made that an employee has been unfairly dismissed, he or she is automatically entitled to a remedy.

What was the approach adopted by the constitutional court?

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With reference to Kemp t/a Centralmed v Rawlins (2009) 30 ILJ 2677 (LAC), the constitutional court
held the following viewpoint: ‘Although every employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed in
terms of s185(a) of the LRA, the infringement of that right neither necessarily nor automatically
confers a right to a remedy…’

In short, the above approach entails that arbitrators will be required to justify why a remedy (e g
reinstatement, re-employment or compensation) was specifically granted on the facts of the case and,
if they are not able to do so, this would potentially constitute a reviewable ground for such arbitration
award.

The previous article dealt with the distinction between misconduct constituting desertion and misconduct constituting abscondment – see, further, in this regard, Okhahlamba Local Municipality v Mabuya (2021) 32 SALLR 12 (LC).

In this article, what we attempt to do is provide some clarity as to a very different misconduct, namely, the misconduct of deeming desertion.

What is the difference between desertion and abscondment?

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?